SAGES FOR TRANSLATION INTO LATIN PROSE

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PASSAGES FOR TRANSLATION.

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WITH

AN INTRODUCTION

BY

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PREFACE.

This little book consists of two parts, an Introduction, and a selection of passages for translation. The Introduction deals (1) with political and social ideas as expressed in Latin, (2) with the range of metaphor known to Latin writers, (3) with the historical development of Latin prose style. It is intended to meet, to some small extent, the wants of such students of Latin as may be supposed to have mastered the ordinary laws of syntax and prose structure, and to have gained a fair command of the Latin vocabulary; but who desire some guidance to a more accurate knowledge of Latin expression in its higher ranges, and to a rational appreciation of Latin style. Having, for the last five or six years, made a point of lecturing on Latin Prose composition in Oxford, I have found that hints of the kind offered in the Introduction have constantly been required, even by good scholars. I say hints, because the scope of the volume precludes my attempting anything more. But I am not without hope that the suggestions made may open up new points of view not only to students of Latin style, but to students of Latin antiquity generally. Words mean things, and the study of words is the natural introduction to that knowledge of ancient life, social and political, which it is the object of the scholar

to attain. For obvious practical reasons I have added some notes on Latin orthography.

The passages are mostly of my own selection; but a few have been taken from examination papers, or collections based on examination papers.

H. N.

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INTRODUCTION.

I.

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IDEAS.

A CITY community, the πόλις of the Greeks, is in Latin called *populus*. *Populus* is the whole community, embracing all orders of citizens, and including, therefore, patricians and plebeians as its constituent parts. *Gens* stands in two relations to *populus*. It means either a family included in the sphere of the *populus*, as the *gens Fabia*, or *gens Cornelia* at Rome; or a tribe or nation, including several *populi* or city communities. Thus Vergil in his tenth *Aeneid* (v. 205), speaks of the *populi sub gente quaterni*, or four *populi* for each of her own *gentes*, which owned the supremacy of Mantua; and Livy (4, 56) says, *eorum* (*Antiatium*) *legatos utriusque gentis* (i.e. *Aequorum et Volscorum*), *populos circumisse.*

It is important to notice that the plural *populi* is

always used in the strictly plural sense of communities, cities, never in the sense of a single community. When Vergil at the beginning of his fourth *Georgic*, says poetically, that he will tell of *totius gentis Mores ac studia ac populos ac proelia;* he means that his theme will include the townships or communities of the bees.

Natio, which like *gens*, means a nation or tribe, is generally applied to non-Italian races. *Exterae gentes*, *exterae nationes*, and other expressions of the kind, are common in Cicero.

We have noticed that *populus* means the whole community, not any part of it. *Publicus* (=*poplicus*) and *popularis* means, therefore, what affects or belongs to the whole people. This brings us to the consideration of the important expression, *res publica*. *Res*, in all probability, meant originally wealth or possessions, and so, by an easy transition, came to be used for power. Its meaning soon extended, very much as did the meaning of the English word power. In old Latin (as in Plautus), *res* often meant the state; and so Ennius said of Fabius Maximus, that *unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem*. Thus, *res Romana*, *res Albana*, would be used for the Roman or Alban state or power. *Res publica* then properly means the power of the *populus*. And as, where the power of a people is, there is its main interest or concern, *res*

publica easily came to mean the interest, concern of the *populus*. Cicero says (*De Re Publica*, 1, § 48), *a regum et a patrum dominatione solere in libertatem rem populi vindicari;* and just above *hanc unam rite rem publicam, id est rem populi, appellari putant.* From this root spring the various uses of the common phrase *res publica*, one or two of which concern us here.

An older phrase, revived by Vergil (*Aen.* 2. 322; 11. 302), for *res publica*, in the sense of the public interest, is *res summa*. Cicero and Livy sometimes combine the two expressions, and speak of *summa res publica* (for instance, Livy, 39, 16, 3).

In ordinary Latin *res publica* embraces very much what we mean by politics. Thus, *rem publicam adire*, or *capessere*, is to take part in public life: *de re publica loqui*, to speak about the political situation: *rei publicae causa aliquid facere*, to do anything on political grounds. Livy (4, 56, 12), uses the expression *communicare* (*plebi*) *rem publicam*, in the sense of granting to the plebeians a share in political power.

It should be observed that *res publica*, not *res publicae*, is always used by good authors in this connection. *Res publicae* for politics, or public affairs, is bad Latin, unless *publicae* is opposed to *privatae*. *Res privatae atque publicae* is good Latin, in the sense of public and private affairs,

but *res publicae* should not be used alone in this sense.[1]

Thus *res publica* is the state, if regarded as the common wealth or common interest. But if regarded as a body of citizens, the state is *civitas*. *Civitas*, originally meaning citizenship, came to mean the body of citizens, and is thus often used in good Latin, as an exact equivalent for *cives*. But *civitas* often bears the extended meaning in which we use the word society. Sallust says, for instance (*Bellum Catilinae*, 5, 9), *res ipsa hortari videtur, quoniam de moribus civitatis tempus admonuit, supra repetere, ac paucis instituta maiorum, quo modo rem publicam habuerint . . . . . quo modo mutata . . . . . sit disserere.* "Having, as the occasion suggested, touched on the moral condition of Roman society, I need not apologize for explaining the changes which took place in the institutions of our ancestors: what was their political position, how this has changed," etc. So again in the same work (53, § 5), we find *postquam luxu atque desidia civitas corrupta est, rursus res publica magnitudine sua imperatorum atque magistratuum vitia sustentabat*—"the corruption of society by luxury and sloth did not prevent the

[1] It is true that Cicero says (*R. P.* 2, § 16), *Romulus. . . . . omnibus publicis rebus instituendis . . . cooptavit augures.* But here *publicae res* does not mean politics, but public business.

constitution from supporting the burden laid upon it by the vices of its own generals and magistrates." And Seneca says of Cato, *adversus vitia civitatis degenerantis et pessum sua mole sidentis stetit solus, et cadentem rem publicam . . . tenuit.* (*De Constantia Sapientis*, 2, 3.)

It appears, then, that both *res publica* and *civitas* can be used in the sense of a state, a city, a body politic, and that in many cases the terms are synonymous. But *res publica* should be used, if attention is to be drawn to the interest of the state or community, as opposed to that of the individuals composing it: *civitas* should be used, if the point is to call attention to the individual members of the community.

"Constitution," or "form of government," would usually be expressed by *res publica.* Thus, Cicero says (*De Oratore*, 3, § 127): *quae de naturis rerum, quae de hominum moribus, quae de rebus publicis dicerentur*, meaning by *de rebus publicis* about constitutions, the Greek περὶ πολιτειῶν. And again in his *De Re Publica*, (1, § 44), *hoc loquor de tribus his generibus rerum publicarum;* 1, § 69, *de tribus optimis rerum publicarum modis.* But the same idea may be expressed differently: for instance, by *forma*, or *conformatio rei publicae.*[1]

[1] Cicero, *R. P.* 1, § 42 (of absolute monarchy), *regnum* (*vocamus*), *eius rei publicae statum:* § 44, *de tribus his generibus rerum*

These expressions, and sometimes *forma civitatis*, or *genus civitatis*, or *discriptio civitatis*, are sometimes used, if attention is to be drawn to the outline or aspect of a constitution. If, however, the idea emphasized is that of a stable or settled condition of political arrangement (as when in English, the phrase "an unconstitutional act" is used of an act which disturbs the fundamental conditions of civil life), then *status* or *status civitatis*, or *status rei publicae* may be used.

If, again, by "constitution" be meant constitutional government as opposed to despotism, the idea may be expressed by *res publica ;* Cicero, *De Re Publica*, 3, § 43, *ubi tyrannus est, ibi non vitiosam, ut heri dicebam, sed ut nunc ratio cogit, dicendum est plane nullam esse rem publicam.* The words *constituere* and *constitutio* are used by Cicero of the act or the method of framing or organizing a constitution, but *constitutio* is not a constitution in the concrete sense. Thus, in the *De Re Publica*, 1, § 3, we find *bene constitutæ civitati*, very much in the sense of "a well-

publicarum. . . . suum statum tenentibus: § 53, *eam formam rei publicae:* § 69, *hac iuncta moderateque permixta conformatione rei publicae:* 2, § 43, *regale genus civitatis:* In *Verr.*, 2, 1, § 18, *hunc statum rei publicae, quo nunc utemur.* Livy, 3, 15, 3, *formaque eadem civitatis esset quae,* etc.*:* 3, 17, 3, *haec vobis forma sanae civitatis videtur?* 45 ,16, 2, *res . . . . in alium statum ex regno formandas.*

organized society;" and again (1, § 69), *placet esse quiddam in re publica praestans et regale, esse aliud auctoritati principum impartitum ac tributum, esse quasdam res servatas iudicio voluntatique multitudinis. Haec constitutio primum habet aequabilitatem magnam*, etc. Not "this constitution," but "this method of arrangement." Again (1, § 41), *omnis civitas, quae est constitutio populi;* "every body of citizens (in their orders), and by this body of citizens I mean the organization of the community:" 1, § 70, *nullam omnium rerum publicarum aut constitutione aut discriptione aut disciplina conferendam esse cum ea, quam patres nostri. . . . reliquerunt;* "in organization, or arrangement, or tradition": 2, § 37, *illud Catonis. . . . nec temporis unius nec hominis esse constitutionem rei publicae*—"the framing of our constitution was not the work of a single age or a single man."

Latin has its definite modes of expression for the different forms of government known to antiquity. A despotism is to Cicero *singulare imperium, singulorum dominatus*, or *regnum*. Or, again, a monarchical state may be called *regale genus civitatis*. The members of an oligarchy or aristocracy are *delecti principes, optimates, optimi*, or *principes* alone. A democracy is *civitas popularis*, or *popularis res publica:* of a mixed constitution Cicero speaks as *id quod erit aequatum et temperatum ex*

tribus optimis rerum publicarum modis; or, *iuncta moderateque permixta conformatio rei publicae.* (*De Re Publica*, 1, §§ 42, 69.)

The general idea of society may, as we have seen above, be expressed in Latin by *civitas*, if by society be meant the body of citizens. Thus, such a phrase as "the moral tone of society has improved," might be expressed in Latin by *mores civitatis in melius mutati sunt.* "A state of society" might well be rendered by *mores, hi mores, his moribus;* the present state of society, in or considering the present state of society. If society means "the age," or "the spirit of the age," a good Latin equivalent (though I do not know that the usage is older than the Augustan age), is *saeculum:* thus Propertius says, *turpius et saecli vivere luxuria:* Seneca (*De Constantia Sapientis*, 2, 3), *saeculo ad summam perducto sollertiam:* Tacitus (*Germania*, 19), *nec corrumpere et corrumpi saeculum vocatur*, "mutual corruption is not excused on the plea of its being the fashion of the time."

Societas can hardly be used as an equivalent for "society." The word means a partnership or alliance, and is always used strictly in this sense in good Latin; so that it stands rather for a definition or description of society, than for society itself. For instance, Cicero

(*De Re Publica*, 1, § 42), says, *illud vinculum, quod primum homines inter se rei publicae societate devinxit:* "in the partnership or association of political life:" *ib.* 1, § 49, *cum lex sit civilis societatis vinculum. . . . quo iure societas civium teneri potest?* etc. Not quite "civil society," but "the association of fellow-citizens." So *ut societas hominum coniunctioque servetur; ius humanae societatis: hominum inter homines societas: ad societatem communitatemque generis humani.* (*De Officiis*, 1, §§ 17, 19, 22; *De Finibus*, 4, § 4.)

The most general word for law, in most of the usages of that expression, is *ius*, the original meaning of which is probably a bond or tie. Thus, *iura consuetudinis, amicitiae, consanguinitatis*, are the bonds of acquaintance, friendship, kindred. In the sense of binding authority, *ius* may mean law; that is, a body of law, as, for instance, in the phrases *ius civile, ius gentium*, the law binding on Roman citizens, the law observed all over the known world. Or again, *ius* may stand for law in the sense of authority or power, as when Horace says, *ius imperiumque Phrahates Caesaris accepit: quem penes arbitrium est et ius et norma loquendi;* or Livy, *Athamania omnis in ius dicionemque Philippi concessit: in ius dicionemque venerunt: sub ius iudiciumque suum totam coegit gentem* (36, 14, 9; 40, 35, 13; 41, 22, 4).

Lex is not, in its original sense, a law, but a formal contract or agreement governing a transaction between two or more persons. Thus, for instance, *lex domus aedificandae* would be the contract or specification, according to which a house is to be built: *lex templi*, the formal provision affecting the use and purposes of a consecrated locality. To take one instance out of a thousand; Iarbas, in the fourth *Aeneid* (v. 213), complains that he gave to Dido *loci leges*, or conditions on which she might occupy the ground on which Carthage was built. So again, in Horace (2 *Epist.* 2, 18), the man who sells the slave, after telling the buyer of his faults, says *prudens emisti vitiorum, dicta tibi est lex:* "you bought the boy with a full knowledge of his faults—you heard the terms of the bargain."

Lex came to mean a law, because a law, according to the Roman constitution, was originally an agreement between the king (or consuls representing him) and the *populus*.

What is the relation, then, between *ius* and *lex*? *Iura* and *leges* are often spoken of together in good Latin, much as we say "laws and ordinances." Thus Lucretius says (5, 1147), *sponte sua cecidit sub leges artaque iura.* But *ius* may be wider than *lex*, as right or power is wider than any particular enactment based upon right or power.

It may, again, be narrower than *lex*, as a particular section or provision of a law is narrower than the whole law. In this sense *ius* occurs always in the plural. Thus Cicero (*De Inventione*, 2, 22) speaks of *iura legitima*, *iura consuetudinis*, *iura naturae*. In another sense, as distinct from *leges*, *iura* often means rules of law, as when a learned lawyer is said *clienti promere iura* (Horace, 2 *Epist.* 1, 104), or *condere iura* (Gaius, *Inst.* 1, 1, 7).[1] In yet another application *iura* are the rules according to which the praetor in his *edictum* announced that he intended to decide particular cases. The praetor is said *iura describere*, or to write down his *iura* for the benefit of intending litigants. Or, again, *iura* may mean the actual decisions given by the praetor in particular cases, and the praetor is said in this connection by Cicero and Livy *iura reddere*. In this sense Vergil says of the husbandman (*Georgic* 2, 501), *nec ferrea iura, Insanumque forum aut populi tabularia vidit*—"the shameless decisions of the courts."

It appears, then, that *ius* is wider than *lex*, as the principle of right which underlies all laws is wider than any special law; but *iura* are narrower than *lex*, as the single provisions of a law, or rules of law, are narrower than the

[1] The common use of *iura* in the sense of rights must, of course, be separated from the usage under discussion.

law which contains them, or the law which they are intended to supplement or illustrate.

Unwritten usage or custom is *mos*, a word which originally seems to have meant measure, and so, as applied to action, a rule or pattern affecting and regulating it. *Mos* may mean either a single usage, or a whole body of usages. In the latter sense the phrase *more institutoque maiorum* is common, and the poets Vergil and Lucretius speak of *mos sacrorum*, or religious usage. So, too, Vergil says of Rome (*Aen.* 6, 852) that it was her mission *pacis imponere morem*, to impose upon the nations the usage or custom of observing peace, to make the *pax Romana* the law of the world.

If *mos* is a custom, *mores* are customs, and so sometimes training, discipline, as when Horace says (4 *Od.* 4, 35) *Utcunque defecere mores Dedecorant bene nata culpae.* But far more frequently *mores* is applied to an age or an individual, and means habits, and so character.

Duty, in the most general sense of the term, is *officium*. *Officium* may mean a particular duty, or duty in general. It is often joined nearly synonymously with *munus*, as when Cicero (*Pro Fonteio*, § 25) says, *huic muneri atque officio praeesse*, or Horace (*Ars Poetica*, 305), *poetae Munus et officium, nil scribens ipse, docebo.* But the words are often used in distinct senses, and the

distinction seems to be this: *Munus*, derived probably from *mu-*, to defend, and connected with *munis*, serviceable or obliging,[1] and *munire*, to make strong, means a service or duty to be performed by a person in some particular capacity, while *officium* means duty in general, in all relations of life. The two words may be found in the same clause in two different senses, as when Cicero says (*De Senectute*, § 35), *nullum officii aut omnino vitae munus;* "no service demanded either by one's duty or by any circumstances of life at all;" or, again (*In Pisonem*, § 23), *toto munere consulatus mei omni officio tuendo:* "by attending with all duty," that is, with scrupulous conscientiousness, "to my functions as consul."

Officium being a duty, an act of service or act of kindness, kind office, in any relation of life, *officiosus* means not officious, but obliging. The inner principle of duty, conscience, if that word be used in the sense of the force which restrains a person from wrong-doing, is *religio*. Cicero, for instance, constantly uses such phrases as *religionem adhibere in aliqua re facienda*, "to act conscientiously, to show a sense of right and wrong, to have

[1] *Immunis* may mean disobliging, as it does in Plautus, *Trinummus* 1 *Amicum castigare ob meritam noxiam Immune est facinus:* so Cicero (*Laelius*, § 50), *non est amicitia immunis neque superba.*

a conscience in a given proceeding." Or he will use such expressions as *fides ac religio*, very much as we speak of honour and conscience. So Caesar says (*De Bello Civili*, 1, 67), *miles in discordia civili timori potius quam religioni consulit:* "thinks more of his fear than his honour." Often, in such a context, *religio* or *officium* might be used indifferently; but *officium* would mean duty, *religio* conscience.

But conscience may have another meaning, namely, the knowledge of what one has done, as when we speak of a good or a bad conscience; and this is not *religio*, but *conscientia*. This word properly means joint knowledge (*conscire*) on the part of those concerned in it, of a proceeding in which two or more persons have taken part. Then, by the familiar metaphor which enables us to divide our own personality into two, a person is said to have joint knowledge with himself of his own acts (*sibi conscire*). *Conscientia facti* may thus mean, according to the context, either one's joint knowledge of a deed done by oneself and others, or merely the knowledge that oneself has done it. The writers of the Ciceronian age frequently express the idea of conscience in this sense by *animi* or *mentis conscientia*. Thus Cicero says (*Pro Roscio Amerino*, § 67), *malae cogitationes conscientiaeque animi*, and Publilius Syrus, *O tacitum tormentum*

animi conscientia. But not unfrequently, even in the Ciceronian age, *conscientia* is used in this sense by itself; sometimes, too, as with us, with an epithet. Cicero (*Ad Atticum*, 13, 20) uses the expression, *a recta conscientia transversum unquam non oportet discedere*, "one should not move a hair's breadth from the position which enables one to maintain a good conscience;" and Sallust (*Bellum Iugurthinum*, 62, 8), *ex mala conscientia digna timere.* In the good writers of the first century A.D., as in Quintilian and Tacitus, *bona* and *mala conscientia* are quite common in the sense of a good and bad conscience.

The English expression "character," if it mean the type impressed upon a person by Nature herself, as distinguished from his nature with habits and customs superadded, may be translated by *natura*, *indoles*, or sometimes *ingenium.* Cicero (*Pro Archia*, § 15) says, *Ego multos homines excellenti animo ac virtute fuisse sine doctrina, et naturae ipsius habitu prope divino per se ipsos et moderatos et graves fuisse;* where *naturae habitus* is very much what we mean by "cast of character." "Natural disposition" might be represented in Latin by *animus. Mores*, on the other hand, means character as formed both by nature and habit. The idea of moral qualities is often expressed in the older writers, and again in

Sallust and Tacitus, by *artes*, often with the qualification of *bonae* or *malae*. In Cicero and Caesar, however, *artes* has usually the exclusive meaning of intellectual accomplishments.

Virtus and *vitium* are, in philosophical or quasi-philosophical language, equivalent to our words virtue and vice. But in popular or non-philosophical parlance *virtus* has rather the general notion of manhood, worth, excellence. A good man, in the widest acceptation of the term, is *vir bonus*, and goodness is *bonitas*. The chief virtues recognized in Latin antiquity may briefly be mentioned here. *Iustus* and *iustitia* give exactly the meaning of their derivatives, just and justice. Honour, in the ordinary and general meaning of the word, is *fides;* truthfulness, *veritas*. *Probus* and *probitas* imply, strictly speaking, the quality of soundness, and so *vir probus*, from meaning a sound or thoroughly trustworthy man, came to mean an upright, honourable man. *Integer*, uncorrupt, expresses the same idea from another point of view. *Apertus* and *simplex* would express the ideas of candour and simplicity, whether in a person or in an action. *Sanctus* is stainless in all relations of life, impervious to any degrading influence whatever. *Severus* and *tristis* may both be used in the sense of incorruptible or strict; thus they are often used in a good sense of per-

sons acting in a judicial capacity. In this connection *severus* means not severe, but upright, while *tristis* goes a little beyond this, and implies the notion of austerity. A conscientious man might be described as *diligens* (careful) or *religiosus* (scrupulous), in accordance with the sense of *religio* which has been discussed above.

Honestus is a word somewhat difficult to translate. It is not honest, which is rather *probus* or *bonus*, but reputable, honourable, and implies that a man stands high both in position and in character. It connotes, in short, rather the distinction conferred on a man by high character than the high character itself. No doubt, connected etymologically with *honor*, and meaning originally distinguished, it came to mean beautiful, as when Vergil says (*Georgic* 4, 232), *Taygete simul os terris ostendit honestum.* Thus, when applied to an act, *honestus* is beautiful, and is used in a moral sense, exactly in the same way as the Greek καλός. Horace says to Maecenas (*Sat.* 1, 6, 63), *placui tibi qui turpi secernis honestum. Benignus* is generous; *largus*, liberal. *Sanctus* and *sanctitas* are as often used of purity as of stainless honour. *Castus* is chaste, while *purus* would rather imply freedom from any moral stain—for instance, if so be, the stain of bloodguiltiness. For instance, the elder Seneca (*Controv.*, 1, 9; p. 71, Bursian) says, *neque*

meretrice castior neque homicida purior. *Pudicus* and *pudicitia* imply personal chastity; *pudens* and *pudor*, modesty, in its special sense. Modesty in its most general sense is expressed by *verecundus* and *verecundia.*

The idea of self-control may be given in Latin by *modestia* or *temperantia*, and their corresponding adjectives. Courage is either *virtus* or *fortitudo*, though the latter word and its adjective, *fortis*, imply properly not so much bravery as stoutness, strength to bear and endure, and so general worth. This is clearly seen in such colloquial expressions as *unde mihi tam fortem tamque fidelem? fortem crede bonumque* (Horace, 2 *Sat.* 5, 102; 1 *Epist.* 9-13).

Practical wisdom or insight is *prudentia;* while *sapientia* rather implies philosophy, or the kind of wisdom which is based upon thought and high cultivation. In this sense Laelius was called *Sapiens* by his friends.

Vitium, as was remarked above, is the philosophical word for vice, but its meaning is properly a flaw or crack. Thus a wall which has cracked is said *vitium fecisse*, and Caesar (*Bell. Civ.* 3, 63) speaks of *vitium munitionis*, meaning a weak place in the fortifications. So that, in a moral sense, *vitium*, as generally used, implies rather a weakness or defect of character than positive depravity. The idea of the word is negative rather than positive.

For fault, the most general term is *culpa*, which seems originally to mean a reproach. A crime is *scelus*, *crimen*, or *flagitium*, *flagitium* being the strongest word of the three. *Probrum* implies a scandal, an outrageously indecent or unbecoming act.

Many of the names of the vices are, as might be expected, the mere negations of their opposite virtues. Thus *improbus* is properly unsound, so untrustworthy, unscrupulous; *inhonestus* is disreputable; *impudens*, shameless; *impudicus*, unchaste; *intemperans*, without self-control; *impurus*, tainted. *Probrosus*, *flagitiosus*, *sceleratus* correspond to the substantives from which they are derived. *Malignus* is niggardly, as *benignus* is generous. *Malitia* is general badness, as *bonitas* is general goodness. *Nequam* and *nequitia* have the special sense of dissolute living.

Superbus, when used in a bad[1] sense, means not so much proud as insolent, overbearing.

Libido is by no means confined to the specific idea of wanton desire. It means uncontrolled or ill-regulated

[1] The word has also a good sense, as applied to things, meaning lofty, kingly, royal, as when Vergil says (*Aen.* 3, 2), *ceciditque superbum Ilium*. *Superbia* is usually employed in a bad sense, for insolence, arrogance, and the like; though Horace says (3 *Od.* 30, 14), *sume superbiam Quaesitam meritis*, meaning "the lofty place."

feeling of any kind, from mere caprice or changeableness of inclination (as when Horace says, *cui si vitiosa libido Feceret auspicium*) to unbridled passion. Cicero constantly uses it in the milder sense, in such phrases as *libido iudiciorum*, the fickle caprice of the law-courts. And thus, in suitable contexts, *libido* might be used in the general sense of uncontrolled emotion, as opposed to *ratio*, or reason. The notion of restless or ill-regulated desire may also be expressed by *cupiditas*, properly the condition of the *cupidus*, or man who is habitually in a state of undue longing or wishing for something. Thus Cicero says of Verres (*In Verrem*, 2, 2, § 184), *quam multas cupiditates, quam varias, quam infinitas habuerit*, and (*De Oratore*, 1, § 194), *domitas habere libidines, coercere omnes cupiditates.* But for the emotions or feelings in general there seems to be no one word in use earlier than the Augustan age, when *adfectus* began to be employed in that sense. The difficulty which even Cicero felt in hitting upon such a term may be seen from the beginning of the third book of the Tusculan Disputations. Wishing to give an equivalent for the Greek word πάθη, he says (§ 7), *Num* (*cadere videntur in sapientem*) *reliquae quoque perturbationes animi, formidines, libidines, iracundiae? haec enim fere sunt eius modi, quae Graeci* πάθη *appellant; ego poteram morbos, et id verbum esset e*

verbo, sed in consuetudinem nostram non caderet. Nam misereri, invidere, gestire, laetari, haec omnia morbos Graeci appellant, motus animi rationi non obtemperantes: nos autem hos eosdem motus concitati animi recte, ut opinor, perturbationes dixerimus, morbos autem non usitate. Motus animi (as may be seen even from this passage) is not a good Latin equivalent for feeling or emotion. Like the Greek word κίνησις, it would stand as a definition of emotion (one might say, for instance, *omnes cupiditates sunt motus animi*), or again as a metaphorical description of it, as when Vergil says (*Georgic* 4, 86), *Hi motus animorum atque haec certamina tanta Pulveris exigui iactu compressa quiescunt;* or Horace (*Ars Poetica*, 111) describes nature as uttering *animi motus*, the stirrings of the soul. That this is so may, I think, be conclusively shown by the following passages from Cicero's *De Officiis*, in which the emotions of the mind are spoken of as resembling the motions of the body —(1, § 100): *maxima vis decori in hac inest parte de qua disputamus; neque enim solum corporis, qui ad naturam apti sunt, sed multo etiam magis animi motus probandi, qui item ad naturam accommodati sunt;* (§ 131), *multo etiam magis elaborandum est ne animi motus a natura recedant; quod adsequemur, si cavebimus ne in perturbationes atque exanimationes incidamus*, etc. And again

in the following section Cicero includes thoughts as well as feelings in *motus animi: motus autem animorum duplices sunt; alteri cogitationis, alteri appetitus.* It is clear that in all these passages *motus animi* means exactly what it says, not emotion, but stirring or agitation of the mind: just as Cicero uses the phrase *agilitas animi* as a metaphor for what we should call sensibility or sensitiveness.

Such a phrase as "a man of uncontrolled feelings," or "passions," is hardly susceptible of literal translation into classical Latin, though *impotens* would come near it. The Romans would, perhaps, have expressed the idea by specifying what feelings they were which the man could not control; whether, for instance, it was anger, avarice, or superstition to which he was a victim.

Passion, as opposed to reason, may often be rendered by *animus*, as when Horace says (*Epistles*, 1, 2, 62), *animum rege, qui nisi paret Imperat;* or even by *mens*, as when he says (1 *Od.* 16, 22), *Compesce mentem;* or as when Vergil in the sixth *Aeneid* speaks of *mala mentis gaudia*, the evil joys of passion.[1] The fact is that both *animus* and *mens* have a very wide application, sometimes standing for passion, sometimes for reason,

[1] *Pectus* is sometimes used of intellect or good sense (as *cor* always is), sometimes of feeling.

sometimes for imagination, sometimes for what we call the soul, as the seat of all these.

In the language of literary criticism *adfectus* is used after the Augustan age in the general sense of feeling or emotion. Quintilian constantly employs it in this sense, making a distinction between *leniores adfectus*, the gentler feelings, such as love and pity, and *adfectus concitati*, or the stronger passions, such as anger. This is his language (*Institutio Oratoria*, 6, 2, 7, 8): *Velut spiritus operis huius atque animus est in adfectibus. Horum autem, sicut antiquitus accepimus, duae sunt species: alteram Graeci* πάθος *vocant, quod nos vertentes recte ac proprie adfectum dicimus, alteram* ἦθος, *cuius nomine, ut ego quidem sentio, caret sermo Romanus. . . . Adfectus igitur concitatos* πάθος, *mites atque compositos* ἦθος *esse dixerunt: in altero vehementes motus, in altero lenes: denique hos imperare, illos persuadere, hos ad perturbationem, illos ad benivolentiam praevalere.* And in his tenth book (1, 48) he says of Homer, *adfectus quidem vel illos mites vel hos concitatos nemo erit tam indoctus qui non in sua potestate hunc auctorem habuisse fateatur.* "No critic will be found so incompetent as to deny that Homer is master of the whole field of emotion, whether gentle or violent."

Turning for a moment to the individual feelings, we

should observe that the most general expression for pleasure is *voluptas*. *Laetus* and *laetitia*, metaphors from the growth of plants, and properly implying healthy growth and fertility, express delight, gladness, exultation, rejoicing. The same idea may be given by *gaudium*, though *gaudium* is also susceptible of a bad meaning, which I do not think ever attaches to *laetitia*. With regard to the opposite emotions, a distinction must be drawn between *dolor*, *luctus*, and *maestitia*, with their respective verbs, *dolere*, *lugere*, and *maerere*. *Dolor* and *dolere* express the idea of pain, physical or mental, and mental pain of all kinds, whether strong annoyance, indignation, or sorrow. It is not unusual, for instance, to find in Cicero and Caesar such expressions as *dolor repulsae*, annoyance at a political defeat. So that "grief" is, generally speaking, a bad translation of *dolor*, though the context may, of course, give it that meaning. Again, *dolor* is pain as felt, not as expressed, while *luctus* is sorrow, both as felt and as expressed. *Luctus*, again, is particularly applied to distress or sorrow felt and expressed by large numbers of persons, as to the agony of a captured city: Sallust (*Bellum Catilinae*, 51, 9), *caedem, incendia, fieri, postremo armis, cadaveribus, cruore atque luctu omnia compleri;* (*Bellum Jugurthinum*, 92, 3), *luctu atque caede omnia complentur;* and so

Vergil in his second *Aeneid*, *Diverso interea complentur moenia luctu: Crudelis ubique Luctus, ubique pavor, et plurima mortis imago* (vv. 298, 368). *Maerere*, *maestus*, *maestitia* express the signs of mourning rather than the sorrow itself—tears, black raiment, and all "trappings and suits of woe." Thus Cicero says, after the death of his daughter Tullia, in an often quoted sentence, *maerorem minui*, *dolorem non possum*, *nec si possim velim.*

Tristis is not so much sad as depressed, gloomy, moody, or even sulky; in more serious applications grim or grisly, as when Vergil speaks of *tristis Erinys*, *tristia bella*. *Tristis poena* is an almost technical expression for a severe punishment.

The motive of an action may be expressed in Latin, according to the meaning of the word motive, either by *ratio* or by *animus*. *Ratio*, which means properly counting or reckoning up, stands constantly in good writers for motive in the sense of consideration of consequences, calculation of advantage to follow from an act. *Quae ratio tibi fuit ita agendi* would mean, "What motive could you have had in acting thus?" *i.e.*, "What were you counting on or thinking about in acting thus?" But if by motive be meant the intention or spirit of an act, *animus* should be used, as in such a phrase as *videndum*

est quo animo id fecerit, "we must consider what was the motive (*i.e.*, the spirit) of the act."

Religion, in the most general sense of the word, may be expressed by *religio*, and superstition by *superstitio*. So *religiosus* and *superstitiosus* are roughly opposed, exactly as are their English derivatives, religious and superstitious. But it is important to define the meaning of *religio* a little more precisely. It seems to mean originally something which restrains or holds back (*re* and *leg-*, to bind); and thus, objectively, a prohibition on the part of a recognized authority; subjectively, a scruple felt in the mind of an individual. A common colloquial expression, to be found in the comedians, was *religio est*, "I cannot do it"—properly, "There is a scruple in my mind which prevents it." This is the subjective sense of the word, which developed, as we saw above, into the meaning of conscience. When, on the other hand, Vergil says (*Georgic* 1, 270), *rivos deducere nulla Religio vetuit*, he seems to me to be using the word in the objective sense, "no religious prohibition has ever said," &c. Exactly in the same way Lucretius says, *religionibus atque minis obsistere vatum*, "the prohibitions and the menaces of prophets." So it came about that *religiones* is often used in the sense of a body of religious laws—a religious system. The singular,

religio, may also be used in the same sense, as when Cicero says (*Pro Flacco*, § 69), *sua cuique civitati religio, nostra nobis.*

Whether, then, by religion be meant a system of religious belief and ceremonial, or the scrupulous feeling of awe and reverence with which an individual regards a supernatural power, *religio* may be used to express it.

II.

THE RANGE OF METAPHORICAL EXPRESSION.

In the following pages I have collected a few instances of metaphorical expression actually employed by good Latin writers. I have not, on the one hand, thought it worth while, for present purposes, to include such expressions as *attendere animo*, *advertere animum*, *praebere aures*, and the like, which, though undoubtedly metaphors, are too common in all prose, to require special notice, and too numerous to be written down here. Nor, on the other hand, have I made any attempt to be exhaustive. I have confined myself to noting instances of the more striking images used by the writers whose prose is tinged with poetry, such as Cicero and Livy,

who, it may be remarked by the way, differ widely in this respect from Varro and Cæsar.

One of the commonest, and, at the same time, most beautiful metaphors, is taken from light and darkness. Read, for example, the following instances: Cicero, *In Verrem*, 2, 3, § 177, *illa omnis pecunia latuit in illa caligine ac tenebris, quae totam rem publicam tum occuparant. De Lege Agraria*, 2, § 69, *habet socerum, qui tantum agri in illis rei publicae tenebris occupavit, quantum concupivit. De Provinciis Consularibus*, § 43. *Ecce illa tempestas, caligo bonorum et subita atque improvisa formido, tenebrae rei publicae, ruina atque incendium civitatis, terror iniectus Caesari de eius actis*, etc. *Post Reditum in Senatu*, § 5, *ex superioris anni caligine ac tenebris lucem in re publica Kalendis Ianuariis dispicere coepistis. Pro Sulla*, § 40, *vos denique in tantis tenebris erroris et inscientiae clarissimum lumen menti meae praetulistis. Philippicae*, 12, § 3, *quod videbam equidem, sed quasi per caliginem: praestrinxerat aciem animi D. Bruti salus. Ib.* § 5, *discussa est illa caligo quam paulo ante dixi: diluxit, patet, videmus omnia.*

Of persons: *Pro Sulla*, § 5, *in quibus subselliis haec ornamenta ac lumina rei publicae viderem, in his me apparere nollem? Philippicae*, 2, § 54, *Cn. Pompeium, quod imperii populi Romani decus ac lumen fuit. Ib.* 11,

§ 14, *lumen et decus illius exercitus paene praeterii, T. Annium Cimbrum.* So, elsewhere, Cicero calls Rome the *lux orbis terrarum;* and, indeed, the image is a favourite one with him in many applications.

In literary criticism *lumen* and *lux* are often used, sometimes for clearness, sometimes for brightness or brilliancy of style: thus Cicero (*De Oratore*, 2, § 119), *artem quidem et praecepta dumtaxat hactenus requirunt, ut certis dicendi luminibus ornentur.* Quintilian, 8, 2, § 23, *in consilio est habendum non semper tam esse acrem iudicis intentionem, ut obscuritatem apud se ipse discutiat et tenebris orationis inferat quoddam intellegentiae suae lumen, sed multis eum frequenter cogitationibus avocari, nisi tam clara fuerint quae dicemus, ut in animum eius oratio, ut sol in oculos, etiamsi in eam non intendatur, occurrat. Ib.* 8, 5, §§ 28, 29 (Quintilian is speaking of the frequency of *sententiae*, or pithy and pointed sayings, and its effect upon style), *praeter hoc etiam color ipse dicendi quamlibet claris, multis tamen ac variis velut maculis conspergitur. Porro, ut adferunt lumen clavus et purpurae in loco insertae, ita certe neminem deceat intertexta pluribus notis vestis. Quare licet haec et nitere et aliquatenus extare videantur, tamen et lumina illa non flammae, sed scintillis inter fumum emicantibus similia dixeris (quae ne apparent quidam, ubi tota lucet oratio, ut in sole sidera ipsa desinunt*

cerni), *et quae crebris parvisque conatibus se attollunt, inaequalia tantum et velut confragosa, nec admirationem consequuntur eminentium et planorum gratiam perdunt.* Matthew Arnold's "sweetness and light" may almost be paralleled from Aulus Gellius (*Noctes Atticae*, 10, 3, § 15), *si quis est tam agresti aure ac tam hispida, quem lux ista et amoenitas orationis verborumque modificatio parum delectat, amat autem priora idcirco quod incompta ac brevia et non operosa, sed nativa quadam suavitate sunt, quodque in iis umbra et color quasi opacae vetustatis est*, etc.

The operations of the elements are also a common source of metaphor in poetical Latin prose. The words *conflare, inflammare, incendere, ardere* are, for instance, very frequent in Cicero, who is fond of such expressions as *conflare invidiam, inflammari, ardere, cupiditate, incendere iram.* Some of the more striking instances of this metaphor which I have observed, are the following: Cicero, *De Re Publica*, 1, § 1, *nec duo Scipiones oriens incendium belli Punici secundi sanguine suo extinxissent. Ib.* 2, § 37, *non latuit scintilla ingenii quae tum elucebat in puero. In Verrem*, 2, 5, § 8, *cum bello sociorum tota Italia arderet. Pro Rabirio Postumo*, § 13, *quamquam tum propter multorum delicta etiam ad innocentium pericula tempus illud exarserat, tamen, cum odium nostrum restingueretis, huic ordini ignem novum subici non*

sivistis. Livy, 3, 35, 2, *tanta exarsit ambitio ut primores quoque civitatis. . . . prensarent homines.* Tacitus, *Dialogus de Oratoribus*, 36, *magna eloquentia, sicut flamma, materia alitur et motibus excitatur et urendo clarescit.*

So from the winds, Cicero, *In Verrem*, 2, 1, 35, *auram posse aliquam adflari in hoc crimine voluntatis defensionisque eorum.* The metaphor *popularis aura, aura favoris*, is too common to need illustration.

A great deal of imagery is drawn from the perils of the sea and of storms, far more formidable to the ancients than to us. Cicero, *R. P.*, 1, § 1, *in his undis ac tempestatibus maluit iactari, quam in illa tranquillitate atque otio iucundissime vivere. Ib.* § 7, *non dubitaverim me gravissimis tempestatibus ac paene fulminibus ipsis obvium ferre conservandorum civium causa. Pro Rabirio Perduellionis Reo*, § 25, *nec tuas umquam rates ad eos scopulos appulisses, ad quos Sexti Titii adflictam navem, et in quibus C. Deciani naufragium fortunarum videres. In Catilinam*, 1, § 22, *quanta tempestas invidiae nobis, si minus in praesens tempus, ... at in posteritatem impendeat:* so exactly, *ib.* 2, § 15, *huius invidiae falsae atque iniquae tempestatem subire. In Verrem*, 3, § 23, *Apronius. . . . immensa aliqua vorago est aut gurges vitiorum turpitudinumque omnium:* so, *Pro Sestio*, § 111, *gurges ac vorago patrimonii. In*

Pisonem, § 20, *ut qui in maximis turbinibus ac fluctibus rei publicae navem gubernassem salvamque in portu conlocassem, frontis tuae nubeculam . . . . pertimescerem. Pro Milone*, § 5, *equidem ceteras tempestates eì procellas in illis dumtaxat fluctibus contionum semper putavi Miloni esse subeundas.* Livy, 42, 62, 4, *modum imponere secundis rebus, nec nimis credere serenitati praesentis fortunae* (the fair weather). 45, 41, 1, *quae duo fulmina domum meam per hos dies perculerint, non ignorare vos, Quirites arbitror.*

Metaphors taken from navigation are quite as common: for instance, Cicero, *Pro Sestio*, § 20, *quis enim clavum tanti imperii tenere et gubernacula rei publicae. . . . maximo cursu et fluctibus posse arbitraretur hominem*, etc. *In Catilinam*, 1, § 12, *exhaurietur ex urbe turrum comitum magna ac perniciosa sentina rei publicae.* Livy, 44, 22, 13, *qui in eodem velut navigio participes sunt periculi.*

Many are taken from the analogy of the human frame: thus, Cicero, *R. P.*, 2, § 3, *nascentem et crescentem et adultam et iam firmam rem publicam. In Catilinam*, § 3, 26, *memoria vestra nostrae res alentur, litterarum monumentis inveterascent et corroborabuntur.*

In Catilinam, 3, § 1, *ex faucibus fati ereptam rem publicam. Pro Archia*, § 21, *urbem . . . . ex totius*

belli ore ac faucibus ereptam. Sallust, *Bellum Catilinae*, 52, 35, *Catilina cum exercitu faucibus urguet, alii intra moenia atque in sinu urbis sunt hostes.*

Os is often used in the sense of impudence: *e.g. In Verrem*, 2, 2, § 48, *nostis os hominis: Pro Rabirio Postumo*, § 34, *quod habeat os, quam audaciam.*

Sinus, gremium, medulla, for "the embrace," "the lap," "the heart." Cicero, *In Catilinam*, 2, § 22, *de complexu eius et sinu. Pro Caelio*, § 59, *cum Metellus abstraheretur e sinu gremioque patriae. Philippicae*, 1, § 36, *in medullis populi Romani et visceribus haerebant.*

Sanguis (for life, life-blood), Cicero, *R. P.*, 2, § 2, *cum rem publicam exsanguem et iacentem sustentasset Demetrius. De Lege Agraria*, 2, § 16, *sanguine maiorum vestrorum partam vobisque traditam libertatem.*

Vena ingenii, Quintilian, 6, 2, § 3: compare Horace, *Ars Poetica*, 410, *ego nec studium sine divite vena, quid facere possit, video:* Juvenal, 7, 53, *vatem egregium, cui non sit publica vena.*

In literary criticism *sanguis* stands for fulness of life and vigour. Cicero, *Brutus*, § 283 (of Calvus), *nimium tamen inquirens in se atque ipse sese observans metuensque ne vitiosum colligeret, etiam verum sanguinem deperdebat.* Quintilian, 8, 3, § 6, *hic ornatus virilis et fortis et sanctus sanguine et viribus niteat:* 10, 1, § 60 (of Archilochus), *plurimum sanguinis atque nervorum.*

Corpus[1] and *caro* are also used metaphorically in literary criticism. Thus Quintilian, 5, 8, § 2, *nervis illis quibus causa continetur adiciunt inducti super corporis speciem.* Tacitus, *Dialogus de Oratoribus*, 26, *plus carnis habet quam sanguinis.*

Nervi (muscles) is very frequent in the sense of vigour, whether in life or in literary style. Cicero, *R. P.*, 1, § 1, *neque id (bellum), excitatum maioribus copiis Q. Maximus enervavisset*, etc. *Philippicae*, 5, § 32, *experietur consentientis senatus nervos atque vires: In Verrem*, 1, § 35, *in quo omnes nervos aetatis industriaeque meae contenderem: Pro Caelio*, § 80, *omnium huius nervorum ac laborum vos . . . . fructus uberes capietis:* Tacitus, *Dialogus de Oratoribus*, 18, *Calvum Ciceroni visum exsanguem et aridum, Ciceronem a Calvo male audisse tamquam solutum et enervem:* Quintilian, 5, 12, 17, *declamationes nervis carent.*

Metaphors from warfare are pretty frequent. The commonest of these is, perhaps, that of wounding: *e.g.*, Cicero, *Ad Fam.*, 4, 6, 2, *nunc autem hoc tam gravi vulnere illa quae consanuisse videbantur recrudescunt: Ad Atticum*, 12, 18, 1, *quae res sit forsitan refrica-*

[1] It should be remembered that the proper meaning of *corpus* is flesh. Thus Lucretius and others use the phrase *amittere corpus*, exactly as we say, "to lose flesh."

tura vulnus meum. As instances of other applications of metaphors from war, may be quoted Cicero, *De R. P.*, 1, § 3, *teneamus eum cursum qui semper fuit optimi cuiusque, neque ea signa audiamus quae receptui canunt: In Pisonem*, § 9, *lex Aelia et Fufia, propugnacula murique tranquillitatis atque otii:* Seneca, *De Providentia*, 4, 1, *calamitates terroresque mortalium sub iugum mittere.*

Quintilian, 8, 3, 2, speaking of style in oratory, says: *cultu vero et ornatu se quoque commendat ipse qui dicit . . . nec fortibus modo sed etiam fulgentibus armis proeliatur:* and again, of sayings, as if they were arrows (10, 1, 60), *breves vibrantesque sententiae.*

The various arts of peace are a fertile source of imagery: for instance, agriculture, as in the following passages: Cicero, *Pro Caelio*, § 42 (of the narrow path of virtue), *haec deserta via et inculta atque interclusa iam frondibus et virgultis deseratur: Pro Ligario*, § 32, *Sabinos . . . totumque agrum Sabinum, florem Italiae ac robur rei publicae: Pro Milone*, § 35, *Clodium, segetem ac materiam suae gloriae: In Verrem*, 2, 3, § 160, *fac fuisse in eo C. Laeli aut M. Catonis materiam atque indolem: Pro Archia*, § 30, *ego vero omnia, quae gerebam, iam tum in gerendo spargere me ac disseminare arbitrabar in orbis terrae memoriam sempiternam.*

Aucupium, aucupari (bird-catching) are often used in the general sense of looking out for a thing, catching at it; thus Cicero would say *aucupari verba, laudem* and the like.

Building: Cicero, *De Lege Agraria*, 1, § 11, *architecti huius legis: Pro Roscio Amerino*, § 132, *omnium architectum ac machinatorem: Pro Cluentio*, § 60, *principem atque architectum sceleris:* Livy, 6, 18, 14, *solo aequandae sunt dictaturae et consulatus, ut caput attollere Romana plebes possit.*

The theatre: Cicero, *In Verrem*, 2, 5, § 35, *ut me et quaesturam meam quasi in aliquo orbis terrarum theatro versari existimarem. Brutus*, § 6, *forum populi Romani, quod fuisset quasi theatrum illius ingenii: De Lege Agraria*, 2, § 49, *vos mihi praetori . . . personam hanc imposuistis, ut*, etc.

Painting: Cicero, *De Re Publica*, 5, § 2, *cum rem publicam sicut picturam accepisset egregiam, sed iam evanescentem vetustate, non modo eam coloribus iisdem quibus fuerat renovare neglexit, sed ne id quidem curavit, ut formam saltem eius et extrema tamquam lineamenta servaret. De Lege Agraria*, 2, § 31, *illis ad speciem atque ad usurpationem vetustatis per triginta lictores auspiciorum causa adumbratis* (*decem viris*). *Pro Rabirio Postumo*, § 41, *umbram equitis Romani et imaginem videtis.*

The following instances of metaphorical usages, taken from the common surroundings of life, hardly admit of definite classification.

Vinculum is very common in the sense of a tie, a bond: *e.g.*, Cicero, *De Officiis*, 3, § 111, *nullum vinculum ad astringendam fidem iure iurando maiores artius esse voluerunt.*

So Cicero (*In Verrem*, 5, § 39), says *ut earum rerum vi et auctoritate omnia repagula pudoris officiique perfringeres* (break through all the barriers of shame); and again, he uses *cancelli* several times for limits, bounds: *Pro Quinctio*, § 36, *si extra hos cancellos egrediar, quos mihi ipse circumdedi: In Verrem*, 2, 3, § 135, *satisne vobis praetori improbo circumdati cancelli videntur in sua provincia, immo vero in sella ac tribunali? De Oratore*, 1, § 52, *quasi certarum rerum forensibus cancellis circumscripta scientia.*

A statesman is spoken of as a steward by Cicero, *De Re Publica*, 5, § 5, *sic noster hic rector studuerit sane iuri et legibus cognoscendis, . . . sed se . . . ne impediat, ut quasi dispensare rem publicam et in ea quodam modo vilicare possit.*

Supellex is used by good authors in the same metaphorical sense as our word furniture; Cicero, *De Oratore*, 1, § 165, *hanc ego omnem scientiam et copiam*

rerum in tua prudentia sciebam esse; in oratoris vero instrumento tantam supellectilem numquam videram. Orator, § 79, *verecundus erit usus oratoriae quasi supellectilis. Supellex est enim quodam modo nostra, quae est in ornamentis, alia rerum, alia verborum.* Seneca *Controversiae*, 1, pr. 23 (p. 55 *Bursian*), *hoc* (*Porcius Latro*) *sententiarum supellectilem vocabat.* Quintilian, 8 praef. § 28, *lectione multa et idonea copiosam sibi verborum supellectilem comparabat.*

Fucus and *fucosus* are often used as we use varnished, veneered, tricked out, to imply a fine appearance hiding the reality: thus Cicero says in the *Pro Plancio*, § 22, *vicinitas . . . non infuscata malevolentia, ... non fucosa, non fallax.* Elsewhere he uses such phrases as *fucosa amicitia*, a hollow friendship.

Macula and *labes* may imply either a moral stain, or a disgrace: Cicero, *Pro Lege Manilia*, § 7, *delenda est illa macula bello Mithridatico priore suscepta: Pro Balbo*, § 15, *huius saeculi macula atque labes, virtuti invidere.*

Contagion and poison in a metaphorical sense may be rendered by their equivalents in Latin: Cicero, *In Verrem*, 2, 5, § 7, *contagio ista servilis belli:* Livy, 3, 67, 6, *discordia ordinum, et venenum urbis huius patrum ac plebis certamina, sustulere illis animos.*

III.

A SHORT ACCOUNT OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF CLASSICAL STYLE IN LATIN PROSE.

It was the tradition of Roman literary criticism that Latin prose was first artistically written by the great statesman Appius Claudius Caecus (censor B.C. 314). Of his style, Cicero, in whose time some of the speeches of Appius were extant, says that he thought it obsolete, and ruder even than that of Cato. This indeed it must have been, coming as it did a full century earlier. Beyond this we have no means of forming a judgment upon it, for not a sentence of Appius's speeches has been preserved. We are obliged to begin our study of Latin prose with the orations of Marcus Porcius Cato the censor (B.C. 234-149).

The history of Latin prose previous to the Ciceronian age may be divided into three periods :—(1) the age of Cato himself, (2) the generation of Laelius and the Gracchi, (3) the generation of Crassus and Antonius, from which we pass, by an almost imperceptible transition, into that of Cicero and Caesar.

(1) Cato's life began at the very time when the study of Greek was becoming a passion with the Romans

of superior taste and intellect. Though he was himself a staunch opponent of Greek influence, it is impossible to suppose that he altogether escaped it. It did not, however, make itself felt at this time in such a way as seriously to modify the roughness of the early Latin composition. This will be easily seen if we examine the following passage from Cato's oration *Pro Rhodiensibus* :—

Scio solere plerisque hominibus rebus secundis atque prolixis atque prosperis animum excellere, superbiam atque ferociam augescere atque crescere. Quod mihi nunc magnae curae est, quod haec res tam secunde processit, ne quid adversi eveniat, quod nostras secundas res confutet, neve haec laetitia nimis luxuriosa eveniat. Adversae res domant, et docent quid opus sit facto. Secundae res transversum trudere solent a recte consulendo atque intellegendo. Quo maiore opere dico suadeoque, uti haec res aliquot dies proferatur, dum ex tanto gaudio in potestatem nostram redeamus.

Atque ego quidem arbitror, Rhodienses noluisse nos ita depugnare, uti depugnatum est, neque regem Persen vicisse. Non Rhodienses modo id noluere, sed multos populos atque multas nationes idem noluisse arbitror. Atque haud scio an partim eorum fuerint, qui non nostrae contumeliae causa id noluerint evenire; sed enim id metuere, si nemo

esset homo quem vereremur, quodque luberet faceremus, ne sub solo imperio nostro in servitute nostra essent. Libertatis suae causa in ea sententia fuisse arbitror. Atque Rhodienses tamen Persen publice numquam adiuvere. Cogitate, quanto nos inter nos privatim cautius facimus. Nam unus quisque nostrum, si quid advorsus rem suam quid fieri arbitratur, summa vi contra nititur ne advorsus eam fiat: quod illi tamen perpessi.

Ea nunc derepente tanta nos beneficia ultro citroque tantamque amicitiam relinquemus? Quod illos dicimus voluisse facere, id nos priores facere occupabimus?

Qui acerrime advorsus eos dicit, ita dicit, hostes voluisse fieri. Ecquis est tandem vostrum qui, quod ad sese attineat, aequom censeat poenas dare ob eam rem quod arguatur male facere voluisse? Nemo, opinor; nam ego, quod ad me attinet, nollem.

I may perhaps be allowed, in speaking of the style of this passage, to quote what I have said in a recent number of the "Journal of Philology." "The style is clear and forcible, it is therefore luminous; but harmony, and therefore beauty, it has none. The sentences follow the thoughts, without any idea of rhythm to modify them. There are but few connecting particles, those employed being of the simplest kind, such as relatives, conditionals, or adversatives. Three consecutive sentences

begin with *atque*. Verbs are often placed in the same position at the end of the sentence, without any attempt to vary the sound; *excellere, augescere, crescere: processerit, eveniat, confutet, eveniat: proferatur, redeamus*. The order of the words is sometimes entirely without art; *secundae res trudere solent a recte consulendo atque intellegendo*. The same idea is reiterated by the use of words almost synonymous; *rebus secundis atque prosperis atque prolixis: superbiam atque ferociam: multos populos atque multas nationes*. Words are repeated for the sake of emphasis and distinctness, to the destruction of true rhetorical effect; *adversae res, secundae res, depugnare uti depugnatum est: adversus rem suam, adversus eam; dicit, ita dicit*."

(2) In the fragments of the speeches of Scipio Aemilianus (184-129 B.C.), it is, I think, possible to trace an attempt towards realizing a more artistic manner of expression. Read, for instance, the following account of the degeneracy of morals at Rome :—

Docentur (pueri nostri) praestigias inhonestas; cum sambucis psalterioque eunt in ludum histrionum. Discunt cantare quae maiores nostri ingenuis probro ducier voluerunt. Eunt, inquam, in ludum saltatorium virgines puerique ingenui. Haec mihi cum quispiam narrabat, non poteram animum inducere ea liberos suos homines

nobiles docere. Sed cum ductus sum in ludum saltatorium, plus medius fidius in eo ludo vidi pueris virginibusque quingentis: in his unum, quod me rei publicae maxime miseritum est, puerum bullatum, petitoris filium, minorem annis duodecim, cum crotalis saltare, quam saltationem impudicus servulus honeste saltare non posset.

In this there is more distinction of manner, more harmoniousness of composition, than in Cato. The following fine climax is preserved from a speech of Scipio:—

Ex innocentia nascitur dignitas, ex dignitate honor, ex honore imperium, ex imperio libertas.

Cicero more than once praises the genius and passionate fervour which in his opinion raised Gaius Gracchus (154-121 B.C.) to the very highest position among Roman orators. In the *Brutus* (§§ 125-126), the one great speaker thus praises the other:—

Sed ecce in manibus vir et praestantissimo ingenio et flagranti studio et doctus a puero, Gaius Gracchus. Noli enim putare quemquam, Bruto, pleniorem aut uberiorem ad dicendum fuisse. Et ille, Sic prorsus existimo, atque istum de superioribus paene solum lego. Immo plane, inquam, Brute, legas censeo. Damnum enim illius immaturo interitu res Romanae Latinaeque litterae fecerunt. Utinam non tam fratri pietatem quam patriae praestare voluisset! quam

ille facile tali ingenio, diutius si vixisset, vel paternam esset vel avitam gloriam consecutus! Eloquentia quidem nescio an habuisset parem neminem. Grandis est verbis, sapiens sententiis, genere toto gravis: manus extrema non accessit operibus eius; praeclare incohata multa, perfecta non plane. Legendus, inquam, est hic orator, Brute, si quisquam alius, iuventuti; non enim solum acuere, sed etiam alere ingenium potest.

The following are among the very few specimens of his style which have survived :—

Versatus sum in provincia, quomodo ex usu vestro existimabam esse, non quomodo ambitioni meae conducere arbitrabar. Nulla apud me fuit popina, neque pueri eximia facie stabant, et in convivio liberi vestri modestius erant quam apud principia.

Ita versatus sum in provincia, ut nemo vere posset dicere assem aut eo plus in muneribus me accepisse, aut mea opera quemquam sumptum fecisse. Biennium fui in provincia. Si ulla meretrix domum meam introivit, aut cuiusquam servulus propter me sollicitatus est, omnium raponum[1] *postremissimum nequissimumque existimatote. Cum a servis eorum tam caste me habuerim, inde poteritis considerare, quomodo me putetis cum liberis vestris vixisse . . . . Itaque, Quirites, cum Romam profectus sum, zonas,*

[1] I propose this reading for *nationum*, which must be corrupt.

quas plenas argenti extuli, eas ex provincia inanes rettuli. Alii vini amphoras, quas plenas tulerunt, eas argento repletas domum reportaverunt.

In the following fragment there is considerable elaboration of structure, and a cadence almost musical:—

Si vellem apud vos verba facere et a vobis postulare, cum genere summo ortus essem, et cum fratrem propter vos amisissem, nec quisquam de P. Africani et Ti. Gracchi familia nisi ego et puer restaremus, ut pateremini hoc tempore me quiescere, ne a stirpe genus nostrum interiret, et uti aliqua propago generis nostri reliqua esset: haud scio an lubentibus a vobis impetrassem.

Here is a specimen of his style in narrative :—

Nuper Teanum Sidicinum consul venit. Uxor eius dixit se in balneis virilibus lavari velle. Quaestori Sidicino a M. Mario datum est negotium uti balneis exigerentur qui lavabantur. Uxor renuntiat viro, parum cito balneas traditas esse et parum lautas fuisse. Idcirco palus destitutus est in foro, eoque adductus suae civitatis nobilissimus homo M. Marius. Vestimenta detracta sunt ; virgis caesus est. Caleni ubi id audierunt, edixerunt ne quis in balneis lavisse vellet, cum magistratus Romanus ibi esset. Terentini ob eandem causam praeta noster quaestores arripi iussit. Alter se de muro deiecit, alter virgis caesus est.

Quanta libido quantaque intemperantia sit hominum adulescentium, uno exemplo vobis ostendam. His annis paucis ex Asia missus est, qui per id tempus magistratum non ceperat, homo adulescens pro legato. Is in lectica ferebatur. Ei obviam bubulcus de plebe Venusina venit, et per iocum, cum ignoraret qui ferretur, rogavit num mortuum ferrent. Ubi id audivit, lecticam iussit deponi; struppis, quibus lectica deligata erat, usque adeo verberari iussit, dum animam efflavit.

(3) A careful reading of these passages will show that there has been a gradual advance from the prose of Cato to that of Gracchus; a progress all in the direction of producing a harmonious effect, partly by a better collocation of the words, partly by subordinating the clauses to one another, and tempering them into a musical period. This tendency is still more apparent in the style of the orator Lucius Licinius Crassus (140-91 B.C.), one of Cicero's masters, and the one with whom Cicero seems to have been most in sympathy. In his treatise entitled *Orator*, Cicero expresses, at great length, his views as to the laws which he thinks should govern the harmonious composition of Latin prose, and the metrical feet with which it was best to conclude the sentence. The principle underlying the rules which he gives is obvious. He takes as his basis the rhythmical laws of Greek prose,

as developed by Isocrates, and modifies them so as to suit the requirements of the Italian ear, which was accustomed to a different accentuation from that of the Greeks.

In § 223 of the *Orator*, Cicero says that the clause, the form of which he most approves, should consist of two short sentences (κόμματα), a larger sentence (κῶλον), and a concluding period (*comprehensio*). This form, he adds, was a favourite one with Crassus, from whom he quotes the following instance :—

Domus tibi deerat? At habebas. Pecunia superabat? At egebas (κόμματα) *: Incurristi amens in columnas: in alienos insanus insanisti* (κῶλον) *: depressam, caecam, iacentem domum pluris quam te et fortunas tuas aestimasti* (*comprehensio*).

The following specimens of Crassus's style will show how nearly we have now arrived at the manner of Cicero, though something of the old formalism still lingers :

'Forte evenit ut in Privernati essemus.' Brute, testificatur pater se tibi Privernatem fundum reliquisse. 'In Albano eramus ego et Marcus filius.' Sapiens videlicet homo cum primis nostrae civitatis norat hunc gurgitem; metuebat ne, cum is nihil haberet, nihil esse ei relictum putaretur. 'In Tiburti forte adsedimus ego et Marcus filius.' Ubi sunt ii fundi, Brute, quos tibi pater publicis commentariis consignatos reliquit? Quod nisi puberem te

iam haberet, quartum librum composuisset, et se etiam in balneis locutum cum filio scriptum reliquisset. Brute, quid sedes? Quid illam anum patri nuntiare vis tuo? Quid illis omnibus, quorum imagines duci vides, quid maioribus tuis? Quid L. Bruto, qui hunc populum dominatu regio liberavit? quid te facere, cui rei, cui gloriae, cui virtuti studere? Patrimonione augendo? At id non est nobilitatis. Sed fac esse, nihil superest: libidines totum dissipaverunt. An iuri civili? Est paternum. Sed dicet te, cum aedes venderes, ne in rutis quidem et caesis solium tibi paternum recepisse. An rei militari? qui nunquam castra videris? An eloquentiae? quae nulla est in te, et quicquid est vocis ac linguae, omne in istum turpissimum calumniae quaestum contulisti. Tu lucem aspicere audes, tu hos intueri? Tu in foro, tu in urbe, tu in civium esse conspectu? tu illam mortuam, tu imagines ipsas non perhorrescis? quibus non modo imitandis, sed ne conlocandis quidem tibi ullum locum reliquisti.

We have now arrived at the period of Cicero and Caesar, the two masters who best combine the essential qualities of good writing, clearness and harmony. Both these writers aim at a clear, broad, periodic style. In the case of both we feel that their manner is greatly influenced by the exigencies of public life; that it is the manner of men accustomed to address large bodies of

people who wish to understand at first hearing, not the manner of the student writing for a small number of select readers.

There is this general resemblance between Cicero and Caesar, and both have the same mastery over the mere mechanism of style. But there is an important difference between them, independent of the fact that we have only specimens of Caesar's most careless work, while much of Cicero's most elaborate writing has survived. The difference is this, that Cicero's prose is poetical, while Caesar's is not. It must not be forgotten that Cicero was nearly a poet. He was undoubtedly a considerable master of metre and poetic diction, and as such was the admiration of Lucretius. His prose is not only beautiful in its harmony and clearness, but charged with metaphorical expression to an extent quite without parallel in any other prose writer of his age. It is this fact, together with his persevering and patriotic devotion to the improvement of Latin writing, his pure taste, and his wide views of culture and education, which makes him, in spite of the fault of excessive diffuseness, the greatest master of Latin prose.

Cicero's early style is marked by great diffuseness, and elaborate balance of structure, as the following specimens will show :

De Inventione, 1, § 1.

Saepe et multum hoc mecum cogitavi, bonine an mali plus attulerit hominibus et civitatibus copia dicendi ac summum eloquentiae studium. Nam cum et nostrae rei publicae detrimenta considero et maximarum civitatum veteres animo calamitates colligo, non minimam video per disertissimos homines invectam partem incommodorum : cum autam res ab nostra memoria propter vetustatem remotas ex litterarum monumentis repetere instituo, multas urbes constitutas, plurima bella restincta, firmissimas societates, sanctissimas amicitias intellego cum animi ratione, tum facilius eloquentia comparatas.

Pro Quinctio, §§ 95-98.

Miserum est deturbari fortunis omnibus, miserius est iniuria : acerbum est ab aliquo circumveniri, acerbius a propinquo ; calamitosum est bonis everti, calamitosius cum dedecore ; funestum est a forti atque honesto viro iugulari, funestius ab eo, cuius vox in praeconio quaestu prostitit ; indignum est a pari vinci aut superiore, indignius ab inferiore atque humiliore ; luctuosum est tradi alteri cum bonis, luctuosius inimico ; horribile est causam capitis dicere, horribilius priore loco dicere. Omnia circumspexit Quinctius, omnia periclitatus est, C. Aquili ; non praetorem modo, a quo ius impetraret, invenire non potuit, atque adeo ne unde arbitratu quidem suo postularet, sed ne amicos

quidem Sexti Naevi, quorum saepe et diu ad pedes iacuit stratus, obsecrans per deos immortales ut aut secum iure contenderent aut iniuriam sine ignominia sibi imponerent. Denique ipsius inimici voltum superbissimum subiit, ipsius Sexti Naevii lacrimans manum prehendit in propinquorum bonis proscribendis exercitatam, obsecravit per fratris sui cinerem, per nomen propinquitatis, per ipsius coniugem et liberos, quibus propior P. Quinctio nemo est, ut aliquando misericordiam caperet, aliquam, si non propinquitatis, at aetatis suae, si non hominis, at humanitatis, rationem haberet, ut secum aliquid integra sua fama qualibet, dum modo tolerabili, condicione transigeret. Ab ipso repudiatus, ab amicis eius non sublevatus, ab omni magistratu agitatus atque perterritus, quem praeter te appellet, habet neminem ; tibi se, tibi suas omnes opes fortunasque commendat, tibi committit existimationem ac spem reliquae vitae.

This is Cicero's earlier manner, comparatively stiff, as well as excessively redundant. It seems that it was not until after his thirty-fifth year that he had really mastered the art of expression. I think it worth while to give the two following specimens, the first from the orations against Verres (70 B.C.), the second from the *Pro Cluentio* (66 B.C.), as instances of his style in middle life. How much more powerful and plastic has it become!

In Verrem, Actio 1, § 1. *Inveteravit enim iam*

opinio perniciosa rei publicae vobisque periculosa, quae non modo Romae sed etiam apud exteras nationes omnium sermone percrebruit, his iudiciis, quae nunc sunt, pecuniosum hominem, quamvis sit nocens, neminem posse damnari. Nunc in ipso discrimine ordinis iudiciorumque vestrorum cum sint parati qui contionibus et legibus hanc invidiam senatus inflammare conentur, reus in iudicium adductus est C. Verres, homo vita atque factis omnium iam opinione damnatus, pecuniae magnitudine, sua spe et praedicatione absolutus. Huic ego causae, iudices, cum summa voluntate et expectatione populi Romani actor accessi, non ut augerem invidiam ordinis, sed ut infamiae communi succurrerem. Adduxi enim hominem in quo reconciliare existimationem iudiciorum amissam, redire in gratiam cum populo Romano, satis facere exteris nationibus possetis, depeculatorem aerarii, vexatorem Asiae atque Pamphyliae, praedonem iuris, labem atque perniciem provinciae Siciliae.

Pro Cluentio, §§ 70-71. *Cum esset egens, sumptuosus, egens, callidus, et cum domi suae, miserrimis in locis et inanissimis, tantum nummorum positum videret, ad omnem malitiam et fraudem versare mentem suam coepit. 'Ego dem iudicibus? mihi ipsi igitur praeter periculum et infamiam quid quaeretur? Nihil excogitem, quam ob rem Oppianicum damnari necesse sit? Quid tandem? (nihil enim est, quod non fieri possit) si quis eum forte casus ex periculo*

eripuerit, nonne reddundum est? Praecipitantem igitur impellamus,' inquit, 'et perditum prosternamus.' Capit hoc consilii, ut pecuniam quibusdam iudicibus levissimis polliceatur, deinde eam postea supprimat, ut, quoniam graves homines sua sponte severe iudicaturos putabat, eos, qui leviores erant, destitutione iratos Oppianico redderet. Itaque, ut erat semper praeposterus atque perversus, initium facit a Bulbo, et eum, quod iam nihil quaesierat, tristem atque oscitantem leviter impellit. 'Quid tu?' inquit, 'ecquid me adiuvas, Bulbe, ne gratis rei publicae serviamus?' Ille vero simul atque hoc audivit, 'ne gratis:' 'Quo voles,' inquit, 'sequar: sed quid adfers'? Tum ei HS quadraginta milia, si esset absolutus Oppianicus, pollicetur, et eum, ut ceteros appellet quibuscum loqui consuesset, rogat, atque etiam ipse conditor totius negotii Guttam aspergit huic Bulbo. Itaque minime amarus iis visus est, qui aliquid ex eius sermone speculae degustarant.

Cicero's style had however at this time not entirely emancipated itself from the formality of his earlier period, as any one will see who studies the peroration of the Verrine orations. It is in his latest years that his manner attains its perfection. Here are two passages, one from the Laelius, and the other from the end of the second Philippic:

(*Laelius*, § 10.) *Ego si Scipionis desiderio me moveri*

negem, quam id recte faciam viderint sapientes, sed certe mentiar. Moveor enim tali amico orbatus, qualis, ut arbitror, nemo unquam erit, ut confirmare possum, nemo certe fuit. Sed non egeo medicina: me ipse consolor, et maxime illo solacio, quod eo errore careo quo amicorum decessu plerique angi solent. Nihil mali accidisse Scipioni puto: mihi accidit, si quid accidit: suis autem incommodis graviter angi non amicum sed se ipsum amantis est. Cum illo vero quis neget actum esse praeclare? Nisi enim, quod ille minime putabat, immortalitatem optare vellet, quid non adeptus est quod homini fas esset optare, qui summam spem civium, quam de eo iam puero habuerant, continuo adulescens incredibili virtute superavit: qui consulatum petivit numquam, factus est bis, primum ante tempus, iterum sibi suo tempore, rei publicae paene sero: qui duabus urbibus eversis inimicissimis huic imperio non modo praesentia, verum etiam futura bella delevit?

(*Philippica* 2, § 118.) *Respice, quaeso, aliquando rem publicam, M. Antoni; quibus ortus sis, non quibuscum vivas, considera. Mecum, ut voles; cum re publica redi in gratiam. Sed de te tu ipse videris; ego de me ipso profitebor. Defendi rem publicam adulescens, non deseram senex: contempsi Catilinae gladios, non pertimescam tuos. Quin etiam corpus libenter obtulerim, si repraesentari morte mea libertas civitatis potest, ut aliquando dolor populi Romani pariat quod tam*

diu parturit. Etenim si abhinc annos prope viginti hoc ipso in templo negavi posse mortem immaturam esse consulari, quanto verius nunc negabo seni? Mihi vero, patres conscripti, etiam optanda mors est, perfuncto rebus iis quas adeptus sum quasque gessi. Duo modo hæc opto, unum ut moriens populum Romanum liberum relinquam, alterum ut ita cuique eveniat, ut de re publica quisque mereatur.

There was a reaction against the Ciceronian style in the last century of the republic, the chief representative of which is Sallust. Whether the historians who wrote between the period of Cato and that of Sallust had followed in Cato's steps, and adopted an abrupt and unperiodic style of writing, cannot now be ascertained. We only know that Cicero complains of the badness of Latin historical writing up to his time. Now if Cicero's models were Isocrates and Crassus, those of Sallust were Thucydides and Cato. In pregnancy of thought Sallust would fain have figured as the Latin Thucydides. In the antique style of his diction, it is well known that he imitated Cato. Quintilian (8, 3, § 29) quotes an epigram upon him :—

Et verba antiqui multum furate Catonis,
Crispe, Iugurthinae conditor historiae.

And it is not impossible that he also imitated Cato in the abrupt and unconnected character of his sentences.

The following extract will give a fair idea of the style of Sallust:

(*Bellum Catilinae c.* 53-54.) *Postquam Cato adsedit, consulares omnes itemque senatus magna pars sententiam eius laudant, virtutem animi ad caelum ferunt, alii alios increpantes timidos vocant. Cato clarus atque magnus habetur, senati decretum fit, sicuti ille censuerat.*

Sed mihi multa legenti, multa audienti, quae populus Romanus domi militiaeque mari atque terra praeclara facinora fecit, forte libuit attendere quae res maxume tanta negotia sustinuisset. Sciebam saepe numero parva manu cum magnis legionibus hostium contendisse. Cognoveram parvis copiis bella gesta cum opulentis regibus, ad hoc saepe fortunae violentiam toleravisse, facundia Graecos, gloria belli Gallos, ante Romanos fuisse. Ac mihi multa agitanti constabat paucorum civium egregiam virtutem cuncta patravisse, eoque factum uti divitias paupertas, multitudinem paucitas superaret. Sed postquam luxu atque desidia civitas corrupta est, rursus res publica magnitudine sua imperatorum atque magistratuum vitia sustentabat, ac, sicut effeta parente, multis tempestatibus haud sane quisquam Romae virtute magnus fuit. Sed memoria mea ingenti virtute divorsis moribus fuere viri duo M. Cato et C. Caesar: quos quoniam res obtulerat, silentio praeterire non fuit consilium, quin utriusque naturam et mores, quantum ingenio possem,

aperirem. Igitur eis genus, aetas, eloquentia, prope aequalia fuere, magnitudo animi par, item gloria, sed alia alii. Caesar beneficiis ac munificentia magnus habebatur, integritate vitae Cato. Ille mansuetudine et misericordia clarus factus, huic severitas dignitatem addiderat. Caesar dando levando ignoscundo, Cato nihil largiundo gloriam adeptus est. In altero miseris perfugium erat, in altero malis pernicies. Illius facilitas, huius constantia laudabatur. Postremo Caesar in animum induxerat laborare, vigilare, negotiis amicorum intentus sua neglegere, nihil denegare quod dono dignum esset, sibi magnum imperium exercitum novom bellum exoptabat, ubi virtus enitescere posset. At Catoni studium modestiae, decoris, sed maxime severitatis erat. Non divitiis cum divite, neque factione cum factioso, sed cum strenuo virtute, cum modesto pudore, cum innocente abstinentia certabat: esse quam videri bonus malebat: ita quo minus petebat gloriam, eo magis illum sequebatur.

Towards the end of the Augustan age a great change in Latin writing begins, which culminates in the style of Tacitus, at the end of the first century A.D. Between Cicero and Tacitus stands Livy, a great admirer of Cicero, and yet the master, the only master, of a style very different from Cicero's, and which was never successfully imitated. Two points should be noticed in the style of Livy. It is perhaps the best example of the periodic manner.

The writer's first aim seems to be to weld his clauses into a harmonious period, over which the reader must pause before he can thoroughly grasp it. It is, secondly, a poetical manner, coloured with expressions which recall, if not Vergil, at least the old poets whom Vergil and Livy undoubtedly studied in common.

Cicero's style, as we have seen, is both periodic and poetical, but not in the same way as Livy's. In constructing his periods Cicero aims only at raising the expectation, and satisfying the requirements of the ear. But his meaning is generally (so far as the form of the sentence goes) clear at first sight, and the grammatical construction is quite simple. Livy's periods are longer and more complicated than Cicero's, and the grammatical structure is elaborately adapted to the exigencies of the composition. Secondly, the poetical character of the style is rather to be traced to study and imitation than (as in the case of Cicero) to a spontaneous impulse towards imaginative expression.

The following is Livy's account of the life and character of Cicero, quoted by the elder Seneca:

M. Cicero sub adventum trium virorum urbe cesserat, pro certo habens, id quod erat, non magis Antonio eripi se quam Caesari Cassium et Brutum posse. Primo in Tusculanum fugit, inde transversis itineribus ad Formianum, ut ab

Caieta navem conscensurus, proficiscitur. Unde aliquotiens in altum provectum cum modo venti adversi rettulissent, modo ipse iactationem navis, caeco volvente fluctu, pati non posset, taedium tandem eum fugae et vitae cepit, regressusque ad superiorem villam, quae paulo plus mille passibus a mari abest, 'Moriar,' inquit, 'in patria saepe servata.' Satis constat servos fortiter fideliterque paratos esse ad dimicandum; ipsum deponi lecticam, et quietos pati quod sors iniqua cogeret, iussisse. Prominenti ex lectica praebentique immotam cervicem caput praecisum est. Nec satis stolidae crudelitati militum fuit; manus quoque, scripsisse aliquid in Antonium exprobrantes, praeciderunt. Ita relatum caput ad Antonium, iussuque eius inter duas manus in rostris positum, ubi ille consul, ubi saepe consularis, ubi eo ipso anno adversus Antonium, quanta nulla unquam humana vox, cum admiratione eloquentiae auditus fuerat. Vix attollentes prae lacrimis oculos homines intueri eius trucidata membra poterant. Vixit tres et sexaginta annos, ut, si vis afuisset, ne immatura quidem mors videri possit. Ingenium et operibus et praemiis operum felix; ipse fortunae diu prosperae et in longo tenore felicitatis magnis interim ictus vulneribus, exilio, ruina partium pro quibus steterat, filiae exitu tam tristi atque acerbo, omnium adversorum nihil, ut viro dignum erat, tulit praeter mortem; quae vere aestimanti minus indigna videri potuit, quod a victore inimico nihil crudelius

passus erat quam quod eiusdem fortunae compos in eo fecisset. Si quis tamen virtutibus vitia pensarit, vir magnus et memorabilis fuit, et in cuius laudes exsequendas Cicerone laudatore opus fuerit.

With the establishment of the empire upon a firm basis, the conditions necessary for producing such a style as that of Caesar or of Cicero disappeared. Oratory was driven from the forum into the senate and the courts of law, and the aim of the speaker was now to please a comparatively small and select audience. A school arose, and soon prevailed, which admired and cultivated not breadth, massiveness, and generous inspiration, but nicety, point, and adornment. The harmonious period was displaced in favour of short, pithy sentences, calculated to strike and surprise the ear: cleverly worded sayings took the place of a manly and comprehensive treatment of facts.

At the same time two changes took place in education which aided the tendency already started. In the first place, the older poets, Ennius, Accius, and Pacuvius, admired of Cicero, were driven from the schools, and Vergil and Horace took their place as school books. This fact encouraged the fancy for giving an artificially poetical colouring to prose: a colouring such as cannot fail to be noticed by a careful reader of Tacitus. In the

second place, the habit of *declamatio*, as it was called, or speaking and writing make-believe orations on fictitious themes, supplanted the older custom of teaching boys to speak and write on *theses*, or general subjects. Instead, for instance, of discussing and illustrating such questions as "the comparative usefulness of the legal and military professions," the youth was taught to treat themes such as "Hannibal deliberates whether to march on Rome after Cannae:" or "Sulla is advised to resign his dictatorship." It will readily be understood that more originality and power of handling was required for the discussion of the *thesis*, in which the student had to find and arrange his own facts and examples, than for the composition of a *declamatio*, in which they were found for him.

The *declamatio*, as may well be imagined, soon degenerated into a barren and formal exercise, in which the main object of the pupil was to make clever points. His eye was directed not to things, but to words and phrases. The result was, as the elder Seneca well puts it, that he wrote not to convince, but to give pleasure. He tried to exhibit, not his case, but his own talent, in a favourable light. And thus it became a main object of a declaimer to adorn his piece with *sententiae* or pithy sayings; to strain the language in every way so as to attract attention;

sometimes to overload a simple matter with a number of words, sometimes only to give a hint when a full explanation was necessary; to depart as far as possible from ordinary language and diction, to challenge the acuteness of the audience by puzzles in expression, and in short to avoid by every possible device the art of saying a plain thing in a plain way.

A strong reaction against this prevailing tendency was headed by Quintilian and his pupil, the younger Pliny. A far greater stylist than Pliny, his friend Tacitus (who was also probably a pupil of Quintilian) made an attempt in his earliest work, the *Dialogus de Oratoribus*, to revive the taste for the republican manner: a taste which was now only represented by a minority among the critics. In the *Dialogus*, Tacitus still writes in the Ciceronian style: but in his later works he abandons the vain attempt to swim against the stream, and throws his whole genius into the opposite direction. He takes the style of Sallust as his basis, but varies and enriches it with all the resources of the prevailing rhetoric. Tacitus may be described as a great master working with bad tools. In his hands the Latin language is strained beyond its powers. The words are made to say what naturally they ought not to say, and the effect is that the reader, if not left in doubt as to the writer's exact meaning, is at any rate constantly in

a state of astonishment at the *tours de force* by which so much is extorted from the words. Read, for instance, the fine account of the last hours of Otho (*Historiae* 2, 48, 49).

Talia locutus, ut cuique aetas aut dignitas, comiter appellatos, irent propere neu remanendo iram victoris asperarent, iuvenes auctoritate, senes precibus movebat, placidus ore, intrepidus verbis, intempestivas suorum lacrimas coercens. Dari naves ac vehucula abeuntibus iubet; libellos epistulasque studio erga se aut in Vitellium contumeliis insignes abolet: pecunias distribuit parce nec ut periturus. Mox Salvium Cocceianum, fratris filium prima iuventa; trepidum et maerentem ultro solatus est laudando pietatem eius, castigando formidinem: an Vitellium tam inmitis animi fore, ut pro incolumi tota domo ne hanc quidem sibi gratiam redderet? Mereri se festinato exitu clementiam victoris; non enim ultima desperatione, sed poscente proelium exercitu remisisse rei publicae ultimum casum. Satis sibi nominis, satis posteris suis nobilitatis quaesitum. — Post Iulios, Claudios, Servios se primum in familiam novam imperium intulisse: proinde erecto animo capesseret vitam, neu patruum sibi Othonem fuisse aut oblivisceretur umquam aut nimium meminisset.

Post quae dimotis omnibus paulum requievit. Atque illum supremas iam curas animo volutantem repens tumultus avertit nuntiata consternatione ac licentia militum: namque

abeuntibus exitium minitabantur atrocissima in Verginium vi, quem clausa domo obsidebant. Increpitis seditionis auctoribus regressus vacavit abeuntium adloquiis, donec omnes inviolati digrederentur. Vesperascente die sitim haustu gelidae aquae sedavit. Tum adlatis pugionibus duobus, cum utrumque pertemptasset, alterum capiti subdidit. Et explorato iam profectos amicos, noctem quietam, utque adfirmatur, non insomnem egit: luce prima in ferrum pectore incubuit . . . . Funus maturatum: ambitiosis id precibus petierat, ne amputaretur caput ludibrio futurum . . . . Quidam militum iuxta rogum interfecere se non noxa neque ob metum, sed aemulatione decoris et caritate principis . . . . Othoni sepulcrum extructum est modicum et mansurum.

With this quotation the chapter may be brought to a close, for Tacitus is the last original genius in the history of Latin prose writing.

IV.

CAUTIONS AS TO ORTHOGRAPHY.

I HAVE thought it worth while to make an alphabetical list of the words about the spelling of which (to judge from the experience I have gained in lecturing) there seems to be most doubt in the minds of students. The correct or more usual spelling is printed on the left hand.

A (interjection) not *Ah.*

Abicio not *Abiicio.*

And so *ad- con- de- e- in- ob- pro- icio.*

Accidere, accedere, accurare &c., more usual than *Adcidere,* &c.

Adulescens as a substantive, not *Adolescens:* but *Adolescens,* as participle of *adolesco.*

Adventicius not *Adventitius.*

Aedilicius not *Aedilitius.*

Agnatus, agnosco more usual than *Adgnatus, adgnosco.*

Appareo more usual than *Adpareo.*

Ascribo, astringo, asto, &c., or *Adscribo,* &c.

Baca not *Bacca.*

Brattea not *Bractea.*

Caelebs not *Coelebs.*

Caelum, *Caelus* not *Coelum.* *Coelus.*

Caenum not *Coenum.*

Caeremonia not *Coerimonia.*

Camena not *Camoena.*

Cena not *Coena.*

Ceteri not *Caeteri.*

Clipeus or *clupeus* not *Clypeus.*

Condicio, bargain (*condico,* = condition) not *Conditio,* but

Condītio (*condīre*), seasoning.

Conditio (*condĕre*), building.

Conitor	not	*Connitor.*
Coniveo	not	*Conniveo.*
Conubium	not	*Connubium.*
Contio	not	*Concio.*
Convicium	not	*Convitium.*
Culleus	not	*Culeus.*
Cumba	not	*Cymba.*

Derigo to straighten, to extend a thing in a straight line, downwards or horizontally.

Dirigo to extend in different directions.

Describo to write down, copy.

Discribo to allot to different people.

Dicio	not	*Ditio.*
Dilectus (a levy)	not	*Delectus.*
Ei (interjection)	not	*Hei.*
Epistula	better than	*Epistola.*
Equos or *ecus*	better than	*Equus.*
Erus	not	*Herus.*
Faenum	not	*Foenum.*
Femina	not	*Foemina.*
Fetus (adjective)	not	*Foetus.*

Fetus (substantive)	not	*Foetus.*
Foedus (adj. and subst.)	not	*Faedus.*
Foeteo, foetidus, foetor	not	*Faeteo*, &c.
Gaius	not	*Caius,*
but abbreviated *C.*	not	*G.*
Gnaeus	not	*Cnaeus,*
but abbreviated *Cn.*	not	*Gn.*
Grai	not	*Graii.*
Harena	not	*Arena.*
Harundo	not	*Arundo.*
Holitor, holus	not	*Olitor, Olus.*
Imperium, impero	better than	*Inperium, inpero.*
Incoho	not	*Inchoo.*
Intellego	not	*Intelligo.*
Lacrima or *Lacruma*	not	*Lacryma.*
Loquella	not	*Loquela.*
Mulcare to mutilate *Multare* (*multa*) to fine	not	*Mulctare, mulcta.*
Neglego	not	*Negligo.*
Nuntius	not	*Nuncius.*
Obscenus	not	*Obscaenus* or *Obscoenus.*

Paenitet	not	*Poenitet.*
Paenula	not	*Poenula.*
Pinna	not	*Penna.*
Praemium	not	*Proemium.*
Proelium	not	*Praelium.*
Querella	not	*Querela.*
Reda	not	*Rheda* or *Rhaeda.*
Saeculum	not	*Seculum*
Saepes, saepire	not	*Sepes, sepire.*
Sĕcus otherwise *Sētius* in an inferior manner	not	*Sectius* or *Secius.*
Silva	not	*Sylva.*
Solacium	not	*Solatium.*

Succipio to catch something falling, but *Suscipio* to hold up.

Sulpur	not	*Sulfur* or *sulphur.*
Summitto	more usual than	*Submitto.*
Taeter	not	*Teter.*
Tribunicius	not	*Tribunitius.*

Umeo, umidus, umor not *Humeo, humidus, humor.*
Umerus not *Humerus.*

Vergilius not *Virgilius.*
Verginius not *Virginius.*

PASSAGES FOR TRANSLATION.

I.

BACON.

From moral virtue let us pass on to matter of power and commandment, and consider whether in right reason there be any comparable with that wherewith knowledge investeth and crowneth man's nature. We see the dignity of the commandment is according to the dignity of the commanded. To have commandment over beasts, as herdsmen have, is a thing contemptible; to have commandment over children, as schoolmasters have, is matter of small honour; to have commandment over galley slaves is a disparagement rather than an honour. Neither is the commandment of tyrants much better, over people which have put off the generosity of their minds; and therefore it was ever holden that honours in free monarchies and commonwealths had a sweetness more than in tyrannies, because the commandment extendeth more over the wills of men, and not only over their deeds and services. And therefore when Virgil putteth himself forth to attribute to Augustus Caesar the best of human honours, he doth it in these words :—

Victorque volentes
Per populos dat iura, viamque adfectat Olympo.

But the commandment of knowledge is yet higher than the commandment over the will, for it is a commandment over the reason, belief, and understanding of man, which is the highest part of the mind, and giveth law to the will itself; for there is no power on earth, which setteth up a throne or chair of state in the spirits and souls of men, and in their cogitation, imagination, opinions, and beliefs, but knowledge and learning.

II.

MILTON.

Worthy deeds are not often destitute of worthy relators; as by a certain fate great acts and great eloquence have most commonly gone hand in hand, equalling and honouring each other in the same ages. 'Tis true, that in obscurest times, by shallow and unskilful writers, the indistinct noise of many battles, and devastations of many kingdoms overrun and lost, hath come to our ears. For what wonder if in all ages ambition and the love of rapine hath stirred up greedy and violent men to bold attempts in wasting and ruining wars, which to posterity have left the work of wild beasts and destroyers, rather than the deeds and monuments of men and conquerors. But he whose just and true valour uses the necessity of war and dominion, not to destroy, but to prevent destruction, to bring in liberty against tyrants, law and civility among barbarous nations, knowing that when he conquers all things else, he cannot conquer time or detraction, wisely conscious of this his want, as well as of his worth not to

be forgotten or concealed, honours and hath recourse to the aid of eloquence, his friendliest and best supply: by whose immortal record his noble deeds, which else were transitory, becoming fixed and durable against the force of years and generations, he fails not to continue through all posterity, over envy, death, and time also victorious.

III.

DRYDEN.

The design, the disposition, the manners, and the thoughts, are all before diction; where any of these are wanting or imperfect, so much wants or is imperfect in the imitation of human life; which is the very first definition of a poem. Words indeed, like glaring colours, are the first beauties that arise and strike the sight; but if the draught be false or lame, the figures ill disposed, the manners obscure or inconsistent, or the thoughts unnatural, then the finest colours are but daubing, and the piece is a beautiful monster at the best. Neither Virgil nor Homer were deficient in any of the former beauties; but in this last, which is expression, the Roman poet is at least equal to the Grecian, as I have said elsewhere; supplying the poverty of his language by his musical ear, and by his diligence. But to return: our two great poets, being so different in their tempers, one choleric and sanguine, the other phlegmatic and melancholic; that which makes them excel in their several ways is, that each has followed his own natural inclination, as well in forming the design as in the execution.

IV.

BOLINGBROKE.

I say then very frankly, that the church and the king having been joined in all the late contests both by those who attacked them and those who defended them, ecclesiastical interests, resentments, and animosities came in to the aid of secular, in making the new settlement. Great lenity was shown at the restoration, in looking backwards: unexampled and unimitated mercy to particular men, which deserved, no doubt, much applause. This conduct would have gone far towards restoring the nation to its primitive temper and integrity, to its old good manner, its old good humour, and its old good nature (expressions of my lord chancellor Clarendon, which I could never read without being moved and softened) if great severity had not been exercised immediately after, in looking forward, and great rigour used to large bodies of men, which certainly deserves censure, as neither just nor politic. I say not just, because there is, after all, a wide difference between moral and party justice. The one is founded in reason; the other takes its colour from the passions of men, and is but another name for injustice.

V.

THE SAME.

Moral justice carries punishment as far as reparation and necessary terror require; no farther. Party justice carries it to the full extent of our power, and even to the

gorging and sating of our revenge; from whence it follows that injustice and violence once begun, must have become perpetual in the successive revolutions of parties, as long as these parties exist. I say, not politic; because it contradicted the other measures taken for quieting the minds of men. It alarmed all the sects anew; confirmed the implacability, and whetted the rancour of some; disappointed and damped a spirit of reconciliation in others; united them in a common hatred to the church; and roused in the church a spirit of intolerance and persecution. This measure was the more imprudent, because the opportunity seemed fair to take advantage of the resentments of the presbyterians against the other sectaries, and to draw them, without persecuting the others, by the cords of love into the pale of the church. . . . But when resentments of the sort we now mention were let loose, to aggravate those of the other sort, there was no room to be surprised at the violences which followed.

VI.

SWIFT.

I have perused many of their books, especially those on history and morality. Among the rest I was much diverted with a little old treatise which treats of the weakness of human kind, and is in little esteem, except among the women and the vulgar. However, I was curious to see what an author of that country could say upon such a subject. This writer went through all the usual topics of European moralists, showing how diminu-

tive, contemptible, and helpless an animal was man in his own nature; how unable to defend himself from the inclemencies of the air, or the fury of wild beasts; how much he was excelled by one creature in strength, by another in speed, by a third in foresight, by a fourth in industry. He added that nature was degenerated in these latter declining ages of the world, and could now produce only small abortive births in comparison of those in ancient times. He said it was very reasonable to think not only that the species of men were originally much larger, but also that there must have been giants in former ages; which, as it is asserted by history and tradition, so it hath been confirmed by huge bones and skulls casually dug up in several parts of the kingdom, far exceeding the common dwindled race of men in our days. He argued that the very laws of nature absolutely required we should have been made in the beginning of a size more large and robust, not so liable to destruction from every little accident of a tile falling from a house, or a stone cast from the hand of a boy, or being drowned in a little brook. From this way of reasoning the author drew several moral applications, useful in the conduct of life, but needless here to repeat. For my own part, I could not avoid reflecting how universally this talent was spread, of drawing lectures on morality, or, indeed, rather matter of discontent and repining, from the quarrels we raise with nature. And I believe upon a strict enquiry, these quarrels might be shown as ill-grounded among us as they are among that people.

VII.

JOHNSON.

He had, apparently, such rectitude of judgment as secured him from everything that approached to the ridiculous or absurd; but as laws operate in civil agency not to the excitement of virtue, but the repression of wickedness, so judgment in the operations of intellect can hinder faults, but not produce excellence. Prior is never low, nor very often sublime. It is said by Longinus of Euripides, that he forces himself sometimes into grandeur by violence of effort, as the lion kindles his fury by the lashes of his own tail. Whatever Prior obtains above mediocrity seems the effort of struggle and of toil. He has many vigorous, but few happy lines; he has everything by purchase, and nothing by gift; he had no "nightly visitations" of the muse, no infusions of sentiment or felicities of fancy.

His diction, however, is more his own than that of any among the successors of Dryden; he borrows no lucky turns, or commodious modes of language, from his predecessors. His phrases are original, but they are sometimes harsh; as he inherited no excellence, none has he bequeathed. His expression has every mark of laborious study; the line seldom seems to have been formed at once; the words did not come till they were called, and were then put by constraint into their places, where they do their duty, but do it sullenly. In his greater compositions there may be found more rigid stateliness than graceful dignity.

VIII.

THE SAME.

If any judgment be made, from his books, of his moral character, nothing will be found but purity and excellence. Knowledge of mankind, indeed, less extensive than that of Addison, will show that to write and to live are very different. Many who praise virtue do no more than praise it. Yet it is reasonable to believe that Addison's profession and practice were at no great variance, since, amidst that storm of faction in which most of his life was passed, though his station made him conspicuous, and his activity made him formidable, the character given him by his friends was never contradicted by his enemies; of those, with whom interest or opinion united him, he had not only the esteem, but the kindness; and of others, whom the violence of opposition drove against him, though he might lose the love, he retained the reverence.

It was justly observed by Tickell that he employed wit on the side of virtue and religion. He not only made the proper use of wit himself, but taught it to others; and from his time it has been generally subservient to the cause of reason and of truth. He has dissipated the prejudice that had long connected gaiety with vice, and easiness of manners with laxity of principle. He has restored virtue to its dignity, and taught innocence not to be ashamed. This is an elevation of literary character "above all Greek, above all Roman fame."

IX.

THE SAME.

He was of a middle stature, of a thin habit of body, a long visage, coarse features, and a melancholy aspect; of a grave and manly deportment, a solemn dignity of mien, but which, upon a nearer acquaintance, softened into an engaging easiness of manners. His walk was slow, and his voice tremulous and mournful. He was easily excited to smiles, but very seldom provoked to laughter.

His mind was in an uncommon degree vigorous and active. His judgment was accurate, his apprehension quick, and his memory so tenacious, that he was frequently observed to know what he had learned from others, in a short time, better than those by whom he was informed; and could frequently recollect incidents, with all their combination of circumstances, which few would have regarded at the present time, but which the quickness of his apprehension impressed upon him. He had the peculiar felicity that his attention never deserted him; he was present to every object, and regardful of the most trifling occurrences. He had the art of escaping from his own reflections, and accommodating himself to every new scene. To this quality is to be imputed the extent of his knowledge, compared with the small time which he spent in visible endeavours to acquire it. He mingled in cursory conversation with the same steadiness of attention as others apply to a lecture; and amidst the appearance of thoughtless gaiety, lost no new idea that was started, nor any hint that could be improved.

X.

GOLDSMITH.

"No sir," replied I, "I am for liberty, that attribute of gods! Glorious liberty! That theme of modern declamation—I would have all men kings. I would be a king myself. We have all naturally an equal right to the throne; we are all originally equal. This is my opinion, and was once the opinion of a set of honest men who were called Levellers. They tried to erect themselves into a community where all should be equally free. But alas! it would never answer; for there were some among them stronger, and some more cunning than others, and these became masters of the rest; for as sure as your groom rides your horses, because he is a cunninger animal than they, so surely will the animal that is cunninger or stronger than he sit upon his shoulders in turn. Since, then, it is entailed upon humanity to submit, and some are born to command and some to obey, the question is, as there must be tyrants, whether it is better to have them in the same house with us, or in the same village, or still farther off, in the metropolis. Now, sir, for my own part, as I naturally hate the face of a tyrant, the farther off he is removed from me, the better pleased am I. The generality of mankind are also of my way of thinking, and have unanimously created one king, whose election at once diminishes the number of tyrants, and puts tyranny at the greatest distance from the greatest number of people. Now the great who were tyrants themselves before the election of one tyrant, are naturally

averse to a power raised over them, and whose weight must ever lean heaviest on the subordinate orders. It is the interest of the great, therefore, to diminish kingly power as much as possible; because whatever they take from that, is naturally restored to themselves; and all they have to do in the state is to undermine the single tyrant, by which they resume their primeval authority."

XI.

HORACE WALPOLE.

I have made several more notes to the new Topography, but none of consequence enough to transcribe. It is well it is a book only for the adept, or the scorners would often laugh. Mr. Gough, speaking of some cross that has been removed, says there is now an *unmeaning market-house* in its place. Saving his reverence and our prejudices, I doubt there is a good deal more *meaning* in a market-house than in a cross. They tell me that there are numberless mistakes. Mr. Pennant, whom I saw yesterday, says so. *He* is not one of our plodders; rather the other extreme. His *corporal* spirits (for I cannot call them animal) do not allow him to digest anything. He gave a round jump from ornithology to antiquity—and, as if they had any relation, thought he understood everything that lay between them. These adventures divert me, who am got on shore, and find how sweet it is to look back on those who are toiling in deep waters, whether in ships or cock-

boats, or on old rotten planks . . . . Captain Grose's dissertations are as dull and silly as if they were written for the Ostrogoth maps of the beginning of the new Topography; and which are so square and so incomprehensible that they look as if they were ichnographies of the New Jerusalem. I am delighted with having done with the professions of author and printer, and intend to be most comfortably lazy, I was going to say idle (but that would not be new) for the rest of my days.

XII.

HUME.

The character of this prince, as that of most men, was mixed: but his virtues predominated extremely above his vices, or, more properly speaking, his imperfections; for scarce any of his faults rose to that pitch as to merit the appellation of vices. He deserves the epithet of a good, rather than of a great man; and was more fitted to rule in a regular established government, than either to give way to the encroachments of a popular assembly, or finally to subdue their pretensions. He wanted suppleness and dexterity sufficient for the first measure; he was not endowed with the vigour requisite for the second. Had he been born an absolute prince, his humanity and good sense had rendered his name happy, and his memory precious: had the limitations on prerogative been, in his time, quite fixed and certain, his integrity had made him regard, as sacred, the boundaries of the constitution. Unhappily, his fate threw him into a

period, when the precedents of many former reigns savoured strongly of arbitrary power, and the genius of the people ran violently towards liberty.

XIII.

THE SAME.

With a detail of his private character we must set bounds to our panegyric on Charles. The other parts of his conduct may admit of some apology, but can deserve small applause. He was, indeed, so much fitted for private life preferably to public, that he even possessed order, frugality, and economy, in the former; was profuse, thoughtless, and negligent, in the latter. When we consider him as a sovereign, his character, though not altogether destitute of virtue, was in the main dangerous to his people, and dishonourable to himself. Negligent of the interests of the nation, jealous of its liberty, lavish of its treasure, sparing only of its blood: he exposed it by his measures, though he ever appeared but in sport, to the danger of a furious civil war, and even to the ruin and ignominy of a foreign conquest. Yet may all these enormities, if fairly and candidly examined, be imputed in a great measure to the indolence of his temper; a fault which, however unfortunate in a monarch, it is impossible for us to regard with great severity.

XIV.

BURKE.

There is a dreadful schism in the British nation. Since we are not able to reunite the empire, it is our business to give all possible vigour and soundness to those parts of it which are still content to be governed by our councils. Sir, it is proper to inform you that our measures must be healing. Such a degree of strength must be communicated to all the members of the state, as may enable them to defend themselves, and to co-operate in the defence of the whole. Their temper too must be managed, and their good affections cultivated. They may then be disposed to bear the load with cheerfulness, as a contribution towards what may be called with truth and propriety, and not by an empty form of words, a common cause. Too little dependence cannot be had, at this time of day, on names and prejudices. The eyes of mankind are opened; and communities must be held together by an evident and solid interest. God forbid, that our conduct should demonstrate to the world that Great Britain can in no instance whatsoever be brought to a sense of rational and equitable policy, but by coercion and force of arms!

XV.

THE SAME.

Nor is it the worst effect of this unnatural contention that our laws are corrupted. Whilst manners remain

entire, they will correct the vices of law, and soften it at length to their own temper. But we have to lament that in most of the late proceedings we see very few traces of that generosity, humanity, and dignity of mind, which formerly characterized this nation. War suspends the rules of moral obligation, and what is long suspended is in danger of being totally abrogated. Civil wars strike deepest of all into the manners of the people. They vitiate their politics; they corrupt their morals; they pervert even the natural taste and relish of equity and justice. By teaching us to consider our fellow-citizens in a hostile light, the whole body of our nation becomes gradually less dear to us. The very names of affection and kindred, which were the bond of charity whilst we agreed, become new incentives to hatred and rage, when the community of our country is dissolved. We may flatter ourselves that we shall not fall into this misfortune. But we have no charter of exemption, that I know of, from the ordinary frailties of human nature.

XVI.

THE SAME.

I entirely agree with you that in all probability we owe our whole constitution to the restoration of the English monarchy. The state of things from which Monk relieved England was, however, by no means at that time so deplorable in any sense as yours is now, and under the present sway is likely to continue. Cromwell had delivered England from anarchy. His government,

though military and despotic, had been regular and orderly. Under the iron, and under the yoke, the soil yielded its produce. After his death, the evils of anarchy were rather dreaded than felt. Every man was yet safe in his house and in his property. But it must be admitted that Monk freed this nation from great and just apprehensions both of future anarchy and of probable tyranny in some form or other. The king whom he gave us was indeed the very reverse of your benignant sovereign, who, in reward for his attempt to bestow liberty on his subjects, languishes himself in prison. The person given us by Monk was a man without any sense of his duty as a prince, without any regard to the dignity of his crown, without any love of his people; dissolute, false, venal, and destitute of any positive good quality whatever, except a pleasant temper, and the manners of a gentleman. Yet the restoration of the monarchy, even in the person of such a prince, was everything to us; for without monarchy in England, most certainly we never can enjoy either peace or liberty.

XVII.

THE SAME.

There is a courageous wisdom: there is also a false, reptile prudence, the result, not of caution, but of fear. Under misfortunes it often happens that the nerves of the understanding are so relaxed, the pressing peril of the hour so completely confounds all the faculties, that no future danger can be properly provided for, can be

justly estimated, can be so much as fully seen. The eye of the mind is dazzled and vanquished. An abject distrust of ourselves, an extravagant admiration of the enemy, present us with no hope but in a compromise with his pride, by a submission to his will. This short plan of policy is the only counsel which will obtain a hearing. We plunge into a dark gulf with all the vast precipitation of fear. The nature of courage is, without a question, to be conversant with danger; but in the palpable night of their terrors, men under consternation suppose, not that it is the danger which, by a true instinct, calls out the courage to resist it, but that it is the courage which produces the danger. They therefore seek for a refuge from their fears in the fears themselves, and consider a temporizing meanness as the only source of safety.

A great state is too much envied, too much dreaded, to find safety in humiliation. To be secure, it must be respected. Power, and eminence, and consideration, are things not to be begged. They must be commanded; and they who supplicate for mercy from others can never hope for justice through themselves.

XVIII.

THE SAME.

Deprived of the old government, deprived in a manner of all government, France, fallen as a monarchy, to common speculators might have appeared more likely to be an object of pity or insult, according to the dis-

position of the circumjacent powers, than to be the scourge and terror of them all; but out of the tomb of the murdered monarchy in France has arisen a vast, tremendous, unformed spectre, in a far more terrific guise than any which ever yet have overpowered the imagination, and subdued the fortitude of man. Going straight forward to its end, unappalled by peril, unchecked by remorse, despising all common maxims and all common means, that hideous phantom overpowered those who could not believe it was possible she could at all exist, except on the principles which habit rather than nature had persuaded them were necessary to their own particular welfare, and to their own ordinary modes of action. But the constitution of any political being, as well as that of any physical being, ought to be known, before one can venture to say what is fit for its conservation, or what is the proper means of its power. The poison of other states is the food of the new republic. That bankruptcy, the very apprehension of which is one of the causes assigned for the fall of the monarchy, was the capital on which she opened her traffic with the world.

XIX.

THE SAME.

With a compelled appearance of deliberation, they vote under the dominion of a stern necessity. They sit in the heart, as it were, of a foreign republic; they have their residence in a city whose constitution has emanated neither from the charter of their king, nor from their

legislative power. There they are surrounded by an army not raised either by the authority of the crown, or by their command; and which, if they should order it to dissolve itself would instantly dissolve them. There they sit, after a gang of assassins had driven away some hundreds of the members; whilst those who held the same moderate principles, with more patience or better hope, continued every day exposed to outrageous insults and murderous threats. There a majority, sometimes real, sometimes pretended, captive itself, compels a captive king to issue as royal edicts, at third hand, the polluted nonsense of their most licentious and giddy coffee-houses. It is notorious that all their measures are decided before they are debated. It is beyond doubt, that under the terror of the bayonet, and the lamp-post, and the torch to their houses, they are obliged to adopt all the crude and desperate measures suggested by clubs composed of a monstrous medley of all conditions, tongues, and nations. Among these are found persons, in comparison of whom Catiline would be thought scrupulous, and Cethegus a man of sobriety and moderation . . . . The assembly, their organ, acts before them the farce of deliberation with as little decency as liberty. They act like the comedians of a fair before a riotous audience; they act amidst the tumultuous cries of a mixed mob of ferocious men, and of women lost to shame, who, according to their insolent fancies, direct, control, applaud, explode them, and sometimes mix and take their seats among them; domineering over them with a strange mixture of servile petulance and proud presumptuous authority.

XX.

THE SAME.

All this, I know well enough, will sound wild and chimerical to the profane herd of those vulgar and mechanical politicians who have no place among us; a sort of people who think that nothing exists but what is gross and material; and who therefore, far from being qualified to be directors in the great movement of empire, are not fit to turn a wheel in the machine. But to men truly initiated and rightly taught, these ruling and master principles, which, in the opinion of such men as I have mentioned, have no substantial existence, are in truth everything and all in all. Magnanimity in politics is not seldom the truest wisdom: and a great empire and little minds go ill together. If we are conscious of our situation, and glow with zeal to fill our places as becomes our station and ourselves, we ought to auspicate all our public proceedings on America, with the old warning of the church *Sursum corda!* We ought to elevate our minds to the greatness of that trust to which Providence has called us. By adverting to the dignity of this high calling, our ancestors have turned a savage wilderness into a glorious empire; and have made the most extensive, and the only honourable conquests, not by destroying, but by promoting the wealth, the number, the happiness of the human race.

XXI.

THE SAME.

But it is no reason, because there is a bad mode of enquiry, that there should be no examination at all. Most certainly it is our duty to examine; it is our interest too. But it must be with discretion; with an attention to all the circumstances and to all the motives; like sound judges, and not like cavilling pettifoggers and quibbling pleaders, prying into flaws and hunting for exceptions. Look, gentlemen, at the whole tenor of your member's conduct. Try whether his ambition or his avarice have justled him out of the straight line of duty; or whether that grand foe to the offices of active life, that master-vice in men of business, a degenerate and inglorious sloth, has made him flag and languish in his course? This is the object of our enquiry. If our member's conduct can bear this touch, mark it for sterling. He may have fallen into error; he must have faults; but our error is greater, and our fault is radically ruinous to ourselves, if we do not bear, if we do not even applaud, the whole compound and mixed mass of such a character. Not to act thus is folly; I had almost said it is impiety. He censures God, who quarrels with the imperfections of men.

XXII.

THE SAME.

But if I profess all this impolitic stubbornness, I may chance never to be elected into Parliament. It is certainly not pleasing to be put out of the public service. But I wish to be a member of Parliament, to have my share of doing good and resisting evil. It would therefore be absurd to renounce my objects in order to obtain my seat. I deceive myself indeed most grossly, if I had not much rather pass the remainder of my life hidden in the recesses of the deepest obscurity, feeding my mind even with the visions and imaginations of such things, than to be placed on the most splendid throne in the universe, tantalized with a denial of the practice of all which can make the greatest situation any other than the greatest curse. Gentlemen, I have had my day. I can never sufficiently express my gratitude to you for having set me in a place wherein I could lend the slightest help to great and laudable designs. If by my vote I have aided in securing to families the best possession, peace ; if I have joined in reconciling kings to their subjects, and subjects to their prince ; if I have thus taken part with the best of men in the best of their actions ; I can shut the book. I might wish to read a page or two more ; but this is enough for my measure,— I have not lived in vain.

XXIII.

THE SAME.

There is nothing more memorable in history than the actions, fortunes, and character of this great man, whether we consider the grandeur of the plans he formed, the courage and wisdom with which they were executed, or the splendour of that success, which adorning his youth continued without the smallest reserve to support his age even to the last moments of his life. He lived above seventy years, and reigned, within ten years, as long as he lived—sixty over his dukedom, above twenty over England—both of which he acquired or kept by his own magnanimity, with hardly any other title than he derived from his arms; so that he might be reputed in all respects as happy as the highest ambition the most fully gratified can make a man. The silent inward satisfaction of domestic happiness he neither had nor sought. He had a body suited to the character of his mind; erect, firm, large, and active, whilst to be active was a praise; a countenance stern, and which became command. Magnificent in his living, reserved in his conversation, grave in his common deportment, but relaxing with a wise facetiousness, he knew how to relieve his mind, and preserve his dignity; for he never forfeited by a personal acquaintance that esteem he had acquired by his great actions.

XXIV.

THE SAME.

And now, having done my duty to the bill, let me say a word to the author. I should leave him to his own noble sentiments, if the unworthy and illiberal language with which he has been treated, beyond all example of parliamentary liberty, did not make a few words necessary; not so much in justice to him, as to my own feelings. I must say, then, that it will be a distinction honourable to the age, that the rescue of the greatest number of the human race that ever were so grievously oppressed, from the greatest tyranny that was ever exercised, has fallen to the lot of abilities and dispositions equal to the task; that it has fallen to one who has the enlargement to comprehend, the spirit to undertake, and the eloquence to support, so great a measure of hazardous benevolence. His spirit is not owing to his ignorance of the state of men and things; he well knows what snares are spread about his path, from personal animosity, from court intrigues, and possibly from popular delusion. But he has put to hazard his ease, his security, his interest, his power, even his darling popularity, for the benefit of a people whom he has never seen. This is the road that all heroes have trod before him. He is traduced and abused for his supposed motives. He will remember that obloquy is a necessary ingredient in the composition of all true glory: he will remember, that it was not only in the Roman customs, but it is in the

nature and constitution of things, that calumny and abuse are essential parts of triumph. These thoughts will support a mind, which only exists for honour, under the burden of temporary reproach. He is doing, indeed, a great good; such as rarely falls to the lot, and almost as rarely coincides with the desires, of any men. Let him use his time. Let him give the whole length of the reins to his benevolence. He is now on a great eminence, where the eyes of mankind are turned to him. He may live long, he may do much. But here is the summit. He never can exceed what he does this day.

XXV.

GIBBON.

Our estimate of personal merit is relative to the common faculties of mankind. The aspiring efforts of genius or virtue, either in active or speculative life, are measured not so much by their real elevation as by the height to which they ascend above the level of their age or country; and the same stature which in a people of giants would pass unnoticed, must appear conspicuous in a race of pigmies. Leonidas and his three hundred companions devoted their lives at Thermopylae; but the education of the infant, the boy, and the man, had prepared and almost ensured this memorable sacrifice; and each Spartan would approve, rather than admire, an act of duty of which himself and eight thousand of his fellow-citizens were equally capable. The great Pompey might inscribe on his trophies that he had defeated in battle

two millions of enemies, and reduced fifteen hundred cities from the Lake Maeotis to the Red Sea: but the fortune of Rome flew before his eagles; the nations were oppressed by their own fears; and the invincible legions which he commanded had been formed by the habits of conquest and the discipline of ages. In this view the character of Belisarius may be deservedly placed above the heroes of the ancient republics. His imperfections flowed from the contagion of the times; his virtues were his own, the free gift of nature or reflection; he raised himself without a master or a rival; and so inadequate were the arms committed to his hand, that his sole advantage was derived from the pride and presumption of his adversaries.

XXVI.

GRATTAN.

That man preferred this country and our religion, and brought to both a genius superior to what he found in either; he called forth the latent virtues of the human heart, and taught men to discover in themselves a mine of charity of which the proprietors had become unconscious; in feeding the lamp of charity, he had almost exhausted the lamp of life; he comes to interrupt the repose of the pulpit, and shakes one world with the thunder of the other . . . What reward? . . . The curse of Swift is upon him, to have been born an Irishman; to have possessed a genius, and to have used his

talents for the good of his country. Had this man, instead of being the brightest of preachers, been the dullest of lawyers; had he added to dulness venality, had he aggravated the crime of venality, and sold his vote, he had been a judge. . . . But under the present system, Ireland is not the element in which a native genius can rise unless he sells that genius to the court, and atones by the apostasy of his conduct for the crime of his nativity.

XXVII.

O'CONNELL.

Have you heard of Abercrombie, the valiant and the good, he who, mortally wounded, neglected his wound until victory was ascertained—he who allowed his life's stream to flow unnoticed because his country's battle was in suspense—he who died the martyr of victory—he who commenced the career of glory on the land, and taught French insolence, than which there is nothing more permanent, that the British and Irish soldier was as much his superior by land as the sailor was confessedly by sea —he, in short, who commenced that career which has since placed the Irish Wellington on the pinnacle of glory? Abercrombie and Moore were in Ireland under Camden. Moore, too, has since fallen at the moment of triumph, Moore, the best of sons, of brothers, of friends, of men, the soldier and the scholar, the soul of reason and the heart of pity. Moore has, in documents of which you may plead ignorance, left his opinions upon record

with respect to the cruelty of Camden's administration. But you all have heard of Abercrombie's proclamation, for it amounted to that: he proclaimed that cruelty in terms the most unequivocal; he stated to the soldiery and to the nation that the conduct of the Camden administration had rendered "the soldiery formidable to all but the enemy."

XXVIII.

DE QUINCEY.

Great as Caesar was by benefit of his original nature, there can be no doubt that he, like others, owed something to circumstances; and perhaps, amongst those which were most favourable to the premature development of great self-dependence, we must reckon the early death of his father. It is, or it is not, according to the nature of men, an advantage to be orphaned at an early age. Perhaps utter orphanage is rarely or never such; but to lose a father betimes may, under appropriate circumstances, profit a strong mind greatly. To Caesar it was a prodigious benefit that he lost his father when not much more than fifteen. Perhaps it was an advantage also to his father that he died thus early. Had he stayed a year longer, he might have seen himself despised, baffled, and made ridiculous. For where, let us ask, in any age, was the father capable of sustaining that relation to the unique Gaius Julius—to him, in the appropriate language of Shakespeare, "the foremost man of all this world"? And, in this fine and Caesarean line, "this

world" is to be understood not of the order of coexistences merely, but also of the order of successions; he was the foremost man not only of his contemporaries, but within his own intellectual class of men gènerally—of all that ever should come after him, or should sit on thrones under the denominations of Czars, Kesars, or Caesars of the Bosporus and the Danube; of all in every age that should inherit his supremacy of mind, or should subject to themselves the generations of ordinary men by qualities analogous to his.

XXIX.

CHARLES LAMB.

My dear Manning: The general scope of your letter afforded no indications of insanity, but some particular points raised a scruple. For God's sake, don't think any more of "Independent Tartary." Think what a sad pity it would be to bury such parts in heathen countries, among nasty, unconversable Tartar people! Some say they are cannibals; and then conceive a Tartar fellow eating my friend, and adding the cool malignity of mustard and vinegar! I am afraid 'tis the reading of Chaucer has misled you; his foolish stories about Cambuscan, and the ring, and the horse of brass. Believe me, there are no such things. The Tartars really are a cold, insipid set. . . . You'll be sadly moped, if you are not eaten, among them. Pray try and cure yourself. Take hellebore. Shave yourself oftener. Accustom yourself to write familiar letters on common subjects to

your friends in England, such as are of a moderate understanding. God bless you. Air and exercise may do great things.

Your sincere friend,

C. LAMB.

XXX.

THE SAME.

The true poet dreams being awake. He is not possessed by his subject, but has dominion over it. In the groves of Eden he walks familiar as in his native paths. He ascends the empyrean heaven, and is not intoxicated. He treads the burning marl without dismay; he wings his flight without self-loss through realms of chaos and "old night." Or, if abandoning himself to that severer chaos of "a human mind untuned," he is content awhile to be mad with Lear, or to hate mankind (a sort of madness) with Timon, neither is that madness, nor this misanthropy, so unchecked, but that—never letting the reins of reason wholly go, while most he seems to do so—he has his better genius still whispering at his ear, with the good servant Kent suggesting saner counsels, or with the honest steward Flavius recommending kindlier resolutions. Where he seems most to recede from humanity, he will be found the truest to it. From beyond the scope of Nature to summon possible existences, he subjugates them to the law of her consistency. He is beautifully loyal to that sovereign directress, even when he appears most to betray and desert her.

XXXI.

THE SAME.

In the criminal characters in Shakespeare so little do the actions comparatively affect us, that while the impulses, the inner mind in all its perverted greatness, solely seems real and is exclusively attended to, the crime is comparatively nothing. But when we see these things represented, the acts which they do are comparatively everything, their impulses nothing. The state of sublime emotion into which we are elevated by those images of night and horror which Macbeth is made to utter, that solemn prelude with which he entertains the time till the bell shall strike which is to call him to murder Duncan,—when we no longer read it in a book, when we have given up that vantage-ground of abstraction which reading possesses over seeing, and come to see a man in his bodily shape before our eyes actually preparing to commit a murder, if the acting be true and impressive, as I have witnessed it in Mr. Kemble's performance of that part, the painful anxiety about the act, the natural longing to prevent it while it yet seems unperpetrated, the too close pressing semblance of reality, give a pain and an uneasiness which totally destroy all the delight which the words in the book convey, where the deed doing never presses upon us with the painful sense of presence; it rather seems to belong to history, to something past and inevitable, if it has anything to do with time at all. The sublime images, the poetry alone, is that which is present to our minds in the reading.

XXXII.

THE SAME.

Yet, noble as the whole passage is, it must be confessed that the manner of it, compared with Shakespeare's first scenes, is faint and languid. Its motion is circular, not progressive. Each line revolves on itself in a sort of separate orbit. They do not join into one another like a running hand. Fletcher's ideas moved slow; his versification, though sweet, is tedious, it stops at every turn; he lays line upon line, making up one after the other, adding image to image so deliberately, that we see their junctures. Shakespeare mingles everything, runs line into line, embarrasses sentences and metaphors; before one idea has burst its shell, another is hatched and clamours for disclosure. Another striking difference between Fletcher and Shakespeare is the fondness of the former for unnatural and violent situations. He seems to have thought that nothing great could be produced in an ordinary way. The chief incidents in some of his most admired tragedies show this. Shakespeare had nothing of this contortion in his mind, none of that craving after violent situations, and flights of strained and improbable virtue, which I think always betrays an imperfect moral sensibility. The wit of Fletcher is excellent, like his serious scenes, but there is something strained and far-fetched in both. He is too mistrustful of nature; he always goes a little on one side of her. Shakespeare chose her without reserve, and had riches, power, understanding, and length of days with her for a dowry.

XXXIII.

LANDOR.

Without the sublime, we have said before, there can be no poet of the first order; but the pathetic may exist in the secondary; for tears are more easily drawn forth than souls are raised. So easily are they on some occasions, that the poetical power needs scarcely be brought into action; while on others the pathetic is the very summit of sublimity. We have an example of it in the *Ariadne* of Catullus; we have another in the *Priam* of Homer. All the heroes and gods, debating and fighting, vanish before the father of Hector in the tent of Achilles, and before the storm of conflicting passions his sorrows and prayers excite. But neither in the spirited and energetic Catullus, nor in the masculine and scornful and stern Lucretius, no, nor in Homer, is there anything so impassioned, and therefore so sublime, as the last hour of Dido in the Aeneid. Admirably as two Greek poets have represented the tenderness, the anguish, the terrific wrath and vengeance of Medea, all the works they ever wrote contain not the poetry which Virgil has condensed into about a hundred verses, omitting, as we must, those which drop like icicles from the rigid lips of Aeneas, and also the similes, which here as everywhere sadly interfere with passion. In this place Virgil fought his battle of Actium, which left him poetical supremacy in the Roman world, whatever mutinies and conspiracies may have arisen against him in Germany and elsewhere.

XXXIV.

HALLAM.

Those who know the conduct and character of the Earl of Strafford, his abuse of power in the North, his far more outrageous transgressions in Ireland, his dangerous influence over the king's counsels, cannot hesitate to admit, if indeed they profess any regard to the constitution of this kingdom, that to bring so great a delinquent to justice according to the known process of law, was among the primary duties of the new parliament. It was that which all, with scarce an exception but among his own creatures (for most of the court were openly or in secret his enemies) ardently desired; yet which the king's favour and his own commanding genius must have rendered a doubtful enterprise. He came to London, not unconscious of the danger, by his master's direct injunctions. The first days of the session were critical; and any vacillation or delay in the commons might probably have given time for some strong exercise of power to frustrate their designs. We must therefore consider the bold suggestion of Pym, to carry up to the lords an impeachment for high treason against Strafford, not only as a masterstroke of that policy which is fittest for revolutions, but as justifiable by the circumstances wherein they stood.

XXXV.

THE SAME.

In analyzing the characters of heroes it is hardly possible to separate altogether the share of fortune from their own. The epoch made by Charlemagne in the history of the world, the illustrious families which prided themselves in him as their progenitor, the very legends of romance, which are full of his fabulous exploits, have cast a lustre around his head, and testify the greatness that has embodied itself in his name. None, indeed, of Charlemagne's wars can be compared with the Saracenic victory of Charles Martel; but that was a contest for freedom, his for conquest; and fame is more partial to successful aggression than to patriotic resistance. As a scholar, his acquisitions were probably little superior to those of his unrespected son; and in several points of view the glory of Charlemagne might be extenuated by an analytical dissection. But, rejecting a mode of judging equally uncandid and fallacious, we shall find that he possessed in everything that grandeur of conception which distinguishes extraordinary minds. Like Alexander, he seemed born for universal innovation: in a life restlessly active, we see him reforming the coinage and establishing the legal divisions of money; gathering about him the learned of every country; founding schools and collecting libraries; aiming, though prematurely, at the formation of a naval force; attempting, for the sake of commerce, the magnificent enterprise of uniting the

Rhine and Danube; and meditating to mould the discordant codes of Roman and barbarian laws into an uniform system.

XXXVI.

THE SAME.

It is a singular part of Cromwell's system of policy, that he would neither reign with parliaments nor without them; impatient of an opposition which he was sure to experience, he still never seems to have meditated the attainment of a naked and avowed despotism. This was probably due to his observation of the ruinous consequences that Charles had brought on himself by that course, and his knowledge of the temper of the English, never content without the exterior forms of liberty, as well as to the suggestions of counsellors who were not destitute of concern for the laws. He had also his great design yet to accomplish, which could only be safely done under the sanction of a parliament. A very short time, accordingly, before his death, we find that he had not only resolved to meet once more the representatives of the nation, but was tampering with several of the leading officers to obtain their consent to an hereditary succession. The majority however of a council of nine, to whom he referred this suggestion, would only consent that the protector for the time being should have the power of nominating his successor; a vain attempt to escape from that regal form of government which they had been taught to abhor.

XXXVII.

THE SAME.

Few personages in history have had so much of their actions revealed and commented upon as James; it is perhaps a mortifying truth that those who have stood highest with posterity have seldom been those who have been most accurately known.

The turn of his mind was rather peculiar, and laid him open, with some justice, to very opposite censures—for an extreme obstinacy in retaining his opinion, and for an excessive facility in adopting that of others. But the apparent incongruity ceases, when we observe that he was tenacious of ends, and irresolute as to means; better fitted to reason than to act; never swerving from a few main principles, but diffident of his own judgment in its application to the course of affairs. His chief talent was an acuteness in dispute; a talent not usually much exercised by kings, but which the strange events of his life called into action. He had, unfortunately for himself, gone into the study most fashionable in that age, of polemical theology; and, though not at all learned, had read enough of the English divines to maintain their side of the current controversies with much dexterity. But this unkingly talent was a poor compensation for the continual mistakes of his judgment in the art of government and the conduct of his affairs.

XXXVIII.

THE SAME.

It would surely be erroneous to conceive that many acts of government in the four preceding reigns had not appeared at the time arbitrary and unconstitutional. If indeed we are not mistaken in judging them according to the ancient law, they must have been viewed in the same light by contemporaries, who were full as able to try them by that standard. But, to repeat what I have once before said, the extant documents from which we draw our knowledge of constitutional history under those reigns are so scanty, that instances even of a successful parliamentary resistance to measures of the crown may have left no memorial. . . . Camden, writing to the next generation, though far from an ingenuous historian, is somewhat less under restraint. This forced silence of history is much more to be suspected after the use of printing and the Reformation, than in the ages when monks compiled annals in the convents, reckless of the censure of courts, because independent of their permission. Grosser ignorance of public transactions is undoubtedly to be found in the chronicles of the middle ages; but far less of that deliberate mendacity, or that insidious suppression, by which fear, and flattery, and hatred, and the thirst of gain, have since the invention of printing, corrupted so much of historical literature throughout Europe.

XXXIX.

THE SAME.

It was now perhaps too late for the king, by any reform or concession, to regain that public esteem which he had forfeited. Deceived by an overweening opinion of his own learning, which was not inconsiderable, of his general abilities, which were far from contemptible, and his capacity for government, which was very small, . . . he had wholly overlooked the real difficulties of his position; as a foreigner, rather distantly connected with the royal stock, and as a native of a hostile and hateful kingdom, come to succeed the most renowned of sovereigns, and to grasp a sceptre which deep policy and long experience had taught her admirably to wield. The people were proud of martial glory; he spoke only of the blessing of the peace-makers: they abhorred the court of Spain; he sought its friendship: they asked indulgence for scrupulous consciences; he would bear no deviation from conformity: . . . they had been used to the utmost frugality in dispensing the public treasure; he squandered it on unworthy favourites: they had seen at least exterior decency of morals prevail in the queen's court; they now only heard of its dissoluteness and extravagance: they had imbibed an exclusive fondness for the common law, the source of their liberties and privileges; the churchmen and courtiers, but none more than himself, talked of absolute power and the imprescriptible rights of monarchy.

XL.

THE SAME.

The peace of Constance presented a noble opportunity to the Lombards of establishing a permanent federal union of small republics—a form of government congenial from the earliest ages to Italy, and that perhaps under which she is again destined one day to flourish. They were entitled by the provisions of that treaty to preserve their league, the basis of a more perfect confederacy which the cause of events would have emancipated from every kind of subjection to Germany. But dark long-cherished hatreds, and that implacable vindictiveness which, at least in former ages, distinguished the private manners of Italy, deformed her national character, which can only be the aggregate of individual passions. For revenge she threw away the pearl of great price, and sacrificed even the recollection of that liberty which had stalked like an avenging spirit among the ruins of Milan. It passed away, that high disdain of absolute power, that steadiness and self-devotion which raised the half-civilized Lombards to the level of the ancient republics from whose history our first notions of freedom and virtue are derived. The victim by turns of selfish and sanguinary factions, of petty tyrants, and of foreign invaders, Italy has fallen like a star from its place in heaven; she has seen her harvests trodden down by the horses of the stranger, and the blood of her children wasted in quarrels

not their own : *conquering or conquered*, in the indignant language of her poet, *still alike a slave*, a long retribution for the tyranny of Rome.

XLI.

MACAULAY.

It is impossible to deny that they committed many acts which would justly bring upon a statesman of our time censures of the most serious kind. But, when we consider the state of morality in their age, and the unscrupulous character of the adversaries against whom they had to contend, we are forced to admit that it is not without reason that their names are still held in veneration by their countrymen.

There were, doubtless, many diversities in their intellectual and moral character. But there was a strong family likeness. The constitution of their minds was remarkably sound. No particular faculty was pre-eminently developed, but manly health and vigour were equally diffused throughout the whole. They were men of letters. Their minds were by nature and by exercise well fashioned for speculative pursuits. It was by circumstances, rather than by any strong bias of inclination, that they were led to take a prominent part in active life. In active life, however, no men could be more perfectly free from the faults of mere theorists and pedants. No men observed more accurately the signs of the times. No men had a greater practical acquaintance with human

nature. Their policy was generally characterized rather by vigilance, by moderation, and by firmness, than by invention, or by the spirit of enterprise.

XLII.

THE SAME.

Where the play runs so desperately high as in the seventeenth century, honour is at an end. Statesmen instead of being, as they should be, at once mild and steady, are at once ferocious and inconsistent. The axe is for ever before their eyes. A popular outcry sometimes unnerves them, and sometimes makes them desperate; it drives them to unworthy compliances, or to measures of vengeance as cruel as those which they have reason to expect. A minister in our times need not fear either to be firm or to be merciful. Our old policy in this respect was as absurd as that of the king in the Eastern tale who proclaimed that any physician who pleased might come to court and prescribe for his diseases, but that if the remedies failed the adventurer should lose his head. It is easy to conceive how many able men would refuse to undertake the cure on such conditions; how much the sense of extreme danger would confuse the perceptions and cloud the intellect of the practitioner at the very crisis which most called for self-possession, and how strong his temptation would be, if he found that he had committed a blunder, to escape the consequences by poisoning his patient.

XLIII.

THE SAME.

Chatham, at the time of his decease, had not, in both Houses of Parliament, ten personal adherents. Half the public men of the age had been estranged from him by his errors, and the other half by the exertions which he had made to repair his errors. His last speech had been an attack at once on the policy pursued by the Government, and on the policy recommended by the Opposition. But death restored him to his old place in the affection of the country. Who could hear unmoved of the fall of that which had been so great, and which had stood so long! The circumstances, too, seemed rather to belong to the tragic stage than to actual life. A great statesman, full of years and honours, led forth to the Senate House by a son of rare hopes, and stricken down in full council while straining his feeble voice to rouse the drooping spirit of his country, could not but be remembered with peculiar veneration and tenderness. The few detractors who ventured to murmur were silenced by the indignant clamours of a nation which remembered only the lofty genius, the unsullied probity, the undisputed services of him who was no more.

XLIV.

THE SAME.

His figure, when he first appeared in Parliament, was strikingly graceful and commanding, his features high and noble, his eye full of fire. His voice, even when it sank to a whisper, was heard to the remotest benches; and when he strained it to its full extent, the sound rose like the swell of the organ of a great cathedral, and shook the House with its peal . . . . . He cultivated all these eminent advantages with the most assiduous care. His action is described by a very malignant observer as equal to that of Garrick. His play of countenance was wonderful; he frequently disconcerted a hostile orator by a single glance of indignation or scorn. Every tone, from the impassioned cry to the thrilling aside, was perfectly at his command. It is by no means improbable that the pains which he took to improve his great personal advantages had, in some respects, a prejudicial operation, and tended to nourish in him that passion for theatrical effect which, as we have already remarked, was one of the most conspicuous blemishes in his character . . . . .

He was no speaker of set speeches. His few prepared discourses were complete failures . . . . . "No man," says a critic who had often heard him, "ever knew so little what he was going to say." Indeed, his facility amounted to a vice. He was not the master, but the slave of his own speech.

XLV.

THE SAME.

Yet, with all his faults and affectations, Pitt had, in a very extraordinary degree, many of the elements of greatness. He had genius, strong passions, quick sensibility, and vehement enthusiasm for the grand and the beautiful. There was something about him which ennobled tergiversation itself. In an age of low and dirty prostitution, it was something to have a man who might perhaps, under some strong excitement, have been tempted to ruin his country, but who never would have stooped to pilfer her; a man whose errors arose, not from a sordid desire of gain, but from a fierce thirst for power, for glory, and for vengeance. History owes to him this attestation, that, at a time when anything short of direct embezzlement of the public money was considered as quite fair in public men, he showed the most scrupulous disinterestedness; that, at a time when it seemed to be taken for granted that Government could be upheld only by the basest and most immoral arts, he appealed to the better and nobler parts of human nature; that he made a brave and splendid attempt to do, by means of public opinion, what no other statesman of his day thought it possible to do, except by means of corruption; that he looked for support, not to a strong aristocratical connection, not to the personal favour of the Sovereign, but to the middle class of Englishmen; that he inspired that class with a firm confidence in his integrity and ability; that, backed by them, he forced an unwilling Court and an unwilling oligarchy to

admit him to an ample share of power; and that he used his power in such a manner as clearly proved him to have sought it, not for the sake of profit or patronage, but from a wish to establish for himself a great and durable reputation by means of eminent services rendered to the State.

XLVI.

THE SAME.

The gravest offence of which Hastings was guilty did not affect his popularity with the people of Bengal, for those offences were committed against neighbouring states. Those offences, as our readers must have perceived, we are not disposed to vindicate; yet in order that the censure may be justly apportioned to the transgression, it is fit that the motive of the criminal should be taken into consideration. The motive which prompted the worst acts of Hastings was misdirected and ill-regulated public spirit. The rules of justice, the sentiments of humanity, the plighted faith of treaties, were in his view as nothing, when opposed to the immediate interest of the State. This is no justification, according to the principles either of morality, or of what we believe to be identical with morality, namely, far-sighted policy. Nevertheless, the common sense of mankind, which in questions of this sort seldom goes far wrong, will always recognize a distinction between crimes which originate in an inordinate zeal for the commonwealth, and crimes which

originate in selfish cupidity. To the benefit of this distinction Hastings is fairly entitled.

XLVII.

THE SAME.

The fortunes of Essex had now reached their height, and began to decline. He possessed indeed all the qualities which raise men to greatness rapidly. But he had neither the virtues nor the vices which enable men to retain greatness long. His frankness, his keen sensibility to insult and injustice, were by no means agreeable to a Sovereign naturally impatient of opposition, and accustomed, during forty years, to the most extravagant flattery and the most abject submission. The daring and contemptuous manner in which he bade defiance to his enemies excited their deadly hatred. His administration in Ireland was unfortunate, and in many respects highly blamable. Though his brilliant courage and his impetuous activity fitted him admirably for such enterprises as that of Cadiz, he did not possess the caution, patience, and resolution necessary for the conduct of a protracted war, in which difficulties were to be gradually surmounted, in which much discomfort was to be endured, and in which few splendid exploits could be achieved. For the civil duties of his high place he was still less qualified. Though eloquent and accomplished, he was in no sense a statesman . . . . . The person on whom he chiefly depended was his friend Bacon . . . . . This friend, so

loved, so trusted, bore a principal part in ruining the Earl's life, in shedding his blood, and in blackening his memory.

XLVIII.

THE SAME.

He was a good-natured man, who had during thirty years seen nothing but the worst parts of human nature in other men. He was familiar with the malice of kind people, and the perfidy of honourable people. Proud men had licked the dust before him. Patriots had begged him to come up to the price of their puffed and advertised integrity. He said, after his fall, that it was a dangerous thing to be a minister; that there were few minds which would not be injured by the constant spectacle of meanness and depravity. To his honour it must be confessed that few minds have come out of such a trial so little damaged in the more important parts. He retired, after more than twenty years of supreme power, with a temper not soured, with a heart not hardened, with simple tastes, with frank manners, and with a capacity for friendship. No stain of treachery, of ingratitude, or of cruelty, rests on his memory. Factious hatred, while flinging on his name every other foul aspersion, was compelled to own that he was not a man of blood. This would scarcely seem a high eulogium on a statesman of our times. It was then a high and honourable distinction. The contests of parties in England had long been carried

on with a ferocity unworthy of a civilized people. Sir Robert Walpole was the minister who gave to our Government that character of lenity which it has since generally preserved.

XLIX.

THE SAME.

It was perfectly known to him that many of his opponents had dealings with the Pretender. The lives of some were at his mercy. He wanted neither Whig nor Tory precedents for using his advantage unsparingly. But with a clemency, to which posterity has never done justice, he suffered himself to be thwarted, vilified, and at last overthrown, by a party which included many men whose necks were in his power.

That he practised corruption to a large extent is, we think, indisputable. But whether he deserves all the invectives which have been uttered against him on that account may be questioned. No man ought to be severely censured for not being beyond his age in virtue. . . . . Walpole governed by corruption, because in his time it was impossible to govern otherwise. Corruption was unnecessary to the Tudors, for their Parliaments were feeble. The publicity which has of late years been given to Parliamentary proceedings has raised the standard of morality among public men. The power of public opinion is so great that, even before the reform of the representation, a faint suspicion that a minister had given pecuniary gratifications to Members of Parlia-

ment in return for their votes, would have been enough to ruin him. But, during the century which followed the Restoration, the House of Commons was in that situation in which assemblies must be managed by corruption, or cannot be managed at all.

L.

THE SAME.

The fate of Preston was long in suspense. The Jacobites affected to be confident that the Government would not dare to shed his blood. He was, they said, a favourite at Versailles, and his death would be followed by a terrible retaliation. They scattered about the streets of London papers in which it was asserted that, if any harm befell him, Mountjoy, and all the other Englishmen of quality who were prisoners in France, would be broken on the wheel. These absurd threats would not have deferred the execution one day. But those who had Preston in their power were not unwilling to spare him on certain conditions. He was privy to all the counsels of the disaffected party, and could furnish information of the highest value. He was informed that his fate depended on himself. The struggle was long and severe. Pride, conscience, party spirit were on one side; the intense love of life on the other. He went during a time irresolutely to and fro. He listened to his brother Jacobites, and his courage rose. He listened to the agents of the Government, and his

heart sank within him. In an evening, when he had dined and drunk his claret, he feared nothing. He would die like a man, rather than save his neck by an act of baseness. But his temper was very different when he woke the next morning, when the courage which he had drawn from wine and company had evaporated, when he was alone with the iron gates and stone walls, and when the thought of the block, the axe, and the sawdust rose in his mind. During some time he regularly wrote a confession every morning when he was sober, and burnt it every night when he was merry. His non-juring friends formed a plan for bringing Sancroft to visit the Tower, in the hope, doubtless, that the exhortations of so great a prelate and so great a saint would confirm the wavering virtue of the prisoner. Whether this plan would have been successful may be doubted: it was not carried into effect: the fatal hour drew near; and the fortitude of Preston gave way. He confessed his guilt, and named his accomplices.

LI.

KEATS.

Knowing within myself the manner in which this poem has been produced, it is not without a feeling of regret that I make it public. What manner I mean will be quite clear to the reader, who must soon perceive great inexperience, immaturity, and every error, denoting a feverish attempt rather than a deed accomplished.

The first two books, and indeed the two last, I feel sensible are not of such completion as to warrant their passing the press, nor should they, if I thought a year's castigation would do them any good; it will not, the foundations are too sandy. It is just that this youngster should die away—a sad thought for me—if I had some hope that while it is dwindling I may be plotting and fitting myself for verses fit to live. This may be speaking too presumptuously, and may deserve a punishment, but no feeling man will be forward to inflict it; he will leave me alone with the conviction that there is not a fiercer hell than the failure in a great object. This is not written with the least atom of purpose to forestall criticisms, of course, but from the desire I have to conciliate men who are competent to look, and who do look, with a jealous eye to the honour of English literature. The imagination of a boy is healthy, and the mature imagination of a man is healthy, but there is a space of life between, in which the soul is in a ferment, the character undecided, the way of life uncertain, the ambition thick-sighted; thence proceeds mawkishness and all the thousand bitters which the men I speak of must necessarily taste in going over the following pages. I hope I had not in too late a day touched the beautiful mythology of Greece and dulled its brightness, for I wish to try once more before I bid it farewell.

LII.

THOMAS ARNOLD.

I am delighted that you like Oxford, nor am I in the least afraid of your liking it too much. It does not follow because one admires and loves the surpassing beauty of the place and its associations, or because one forms in it the most valuable and the most delightful friendships, that therefore one is to uphold its foolishness, and to try to perpetuate its faults. My love for any place, or person, or institution, is exactly the measure of my desire to reform them; a doctrine which seems to me as natural now as it seemed strange when I was a child, when I could not make out how, if my mother loved me more than strange children, she should find fault with me and not with them. But I do not think this ought to be a difficulty to any one who is more than six years old. I suppose that the reading necessary for the schools is now so great that you can scarcely have time for anything else. Your German will be kept up naturally enough in your mere classical reading, and ancient history and philosophy will be constantly recalling modern events and parties to your mind, and improving, in fact, in the best way, your familiarity with and understanding of them. But I hope that you will be at Oxford long enough to have one year at least of reading directly on the middle ages or modern times, and of revelling in the stores of the Oxford libraries.

LIII.

THACKERAY.

In these astonishing lines Pope reaches, I think, to the very greatest height which his sublime art has attained, and shows himself the equal of all poets of all times. It is the brightest ardour, the loftiest assertion of truth, the most generous wisdom, illustrated by the noblest poetic figure, and spoken in words the aptest, grandest, and most harmonious. It is heroic courage speaking: splendid declaration of righteous wrath and war. It is the gage flung down and the silver trumpet ringing defiance to falsehood and tyranny, deceit, dullness, superstition. It is Truth, the champion, shining and intrepid, and fronting the great world-tyrant with armies of slaves at his back. It is a wonderful and victorious single combat, in that great battle which has always been raging since society began.

In speaking of a work of consummate art, one does not try to show what it actually is, for that were vain; but what it is like, and what are the sensations produced in the mind of him who views it. But, in considering Pope's admirable career, I am forced into similitudes drawn from other courage and greatness, and into comparing him with those who achieved triumphs in actual war. I think of the works of young Pope as I do of the actions of young Bonaparte or young Nelson. In their common life you will find frailties and meannesses, as great as the vices and follies of the meanest men. But in the presence of the great occasion, the great soul

flashes out, and conquers transcendent. In thinking of the splendour of Pope's young victories, of his merit, unequalled as his renown, I hail and salute the achieving genius, and do homage to the pen of a hero.

LIV.

THE SAME.

How fatal to the parvenu, throughout history, has been this respect for shoebuckles. Where, for instance, would the Empire of Napoleon have been, if Ney and Lannes had never sported such a thing as a coat-of-arms, and had only written their simple names on their shields, after the fashion of Desaix's scutcheon yonder? the bold Republican who led the crowning charge at Marengo, and sent the best blood of the Holy Roman Empire to the right-about, before the wretched misbegotten imperial heraldry was born, that was to prove so disastrous to the father of it. It has always been so. They won't amalgamate. A country must be governed by the one principle or the other. But give, in a republic, an aristocracy ever so little chance, and it works, and sneaks, and bullies, and sneers itself into place, and you find democracy out of doors. Is it good that aristocracy should so triumph? That is a question that you may settle according to your own notions and taste. . . . . But here, in the case of Napoleon, is a simple fact: he founded a glorious, strong, potent republic, able to cope with the best aristocracies in the world, and perhaps to beat them

all; he converts his republic into a monarchy, and surrounds his monarchy with what he calls aristocratic institutions, and you know what becomes of him. The people estranged, the aristocracy faithless (when did they ever pardon one who was not of themselves?), the Imperial fabric tumbles to the ground.

LV.

MILMAN.

The tumult was stilled; but many of the more powerful Lombards retired in disgust to their strongholds. The rest received him as he came forth from that fatal Canosa with cold and averted looks: no one approached him, but they stood apart in small knots, discussing, in hardly suppressed murmurs, his weakness and his disgrace. He retired in shame and sorrow to Reggio. The triumph of sacerdotal Christianity, in the humiliation of the temporal power, was complete, but it was premature. Hildebrand, like other conquerors, must leave the fruits of his victory to later times. He had established in the face of Europe the great principle, the Papal power of judging Kings. Henry himself seemed at first stunned by the suddenness, the force of the blow; Christendom had in like manner been taken by surprise. But the pause of awe and reverence was but brief and transitory; a strong recoil was inevitable; the elements of resistance were powerful and widely spread. The common hatred of Hildebrand brought together again all who, from lower or from loftier motives, abhorred his tyranny: the

Germans, who resented the debasement of the Empire; the Italians, who dreaded the ascendancy of the House of Tuscany; the clergy, who more or less conscientiously were averse to the monastic rigour of Hildebrand, those who had felt or who dreaded his censures.

LVI.

J. H. NEWMAN.

Earthly kingdoms are founded, not in justice, but in injustice. They are created by the sword, by robbery, cruelty, perjury, craft, and fraud. There never was a kingdom, except Christ's, which was not conceived and born, nurtured and educated, in sin. There never was a State but was committed to acts and maxims which it is its crime to maintain, and its ruin to abandon. What monarchy is there but began in invasion or usurpation? What revolution has been effected without self-will, violence, or hypocrisy? What popular government but is blown about by every wind, as if it had no conscience and no responsibilities? What dominion of the few but is selfish and unscrupulous? Where is military strength without the passion for war? Where is trade without the love of filthy lucre, which is the root of all evil? . . . . . But this is the indelible distinction between Christ's kingdom and all other kingdoms, that they spring from evil, and depend on evil; they have their life and strength in bold deeds and bad principles: but that the life of the Church lies, not in inflicting evil, but in receiving it; not in doing, but in suffering; in all those things which the world despises, as being fitter in them-

selves to pull down an empire than to build it up; in patience, in simplicity, in innocence, in concession, in passiveness, in resignation.

LVII.

JAMES HENRY.

(FROM THE END OF HIS COMMENTARY ON THE FOURTH ÆNEID.)

Reader, in whose breast may perhaps yet linger some spark of that *mens* at one and the same time *divinior* and *humanior*, which the combined bands of utilitarianism and puritanism are fast sweeping from the face of this fair world, I would ask thee, ere thou takest leave of the "infelix Phœnissa," what thinkest thou? Does it repent thee of the hour thou hast spent with her, of the tear thou hast perhaps shed over her? Does it regret thee, as it did Augustine, of so much of thy life lost to the exact sciences, to active occupations, even to thy religion? or dost thou dare to feel that the exercise of thine intellectual faculties in the ennobling, exalting, purifying contemplation of the grand, the beautiful, and the pathetic, whether in the poetical, philosophical, or manuplastic creations of the master spirits of mankind, is not, cannot be, of the nature of sin? Thou hesitatest; nor do I wonder: for I too have felt the tyranny of the fashion of the day, the withering oppression of the majority. Go then, and close thine ears against the music of sweet sounds, thine eyes against the gracious forms of the painter's pencil and the sculptor's

chisel; thine heart and understanding against the rushing numbers of the poet, the persuasion of the orator, the irresistible reason of the philosopher, but first hear that same Augustine—what it was that rescued him out of the Tartarus *libidinis et concupiscentiæ*. . . . What was it? The philosophical tract of the prose Virgil of Rome, the pagan Cicero's pagan *Hortensius*.

LVIII.

GOLDWIN SMITH.

The object of all the parties to the negotiations was acquisition of territory at the expense of their neighbours; and the treaty of Westphalia, though, as we have said, it was long the Public Law of Europe, was an embodiment, not of principles of justice or of the rights of nations, but of the relative force and cunning of what are happily called the Powers. . . . . The independence of Germany was saved; and though it was not a national independence, but an independence of petty despotisms, it was redemption from Austrian and Jesuit bondage for the present, with the hope of national independence in the future. When Gustavus broke the Imperial line at Lutzen, Luther and Loyola might have turned in their graves. Luther had still two centuries and a half to wait; so much difference in the cause of history, in spite of all our philosophies and our general laws, may be made by an arrow shot at a venture, a wandering breath of pestilence, a random bullet, a wreath of mist lingering on one of the world's battlefields. But Luther has conquered

at last. Would that he had conquered by other means than war—war with all its sufferings, with all its passions, with the hatred, the revenge, the evil pride which it leaves behind it! But he has conquered; and his victory opens a new, and, so far as we can see, a happier era for Europe.

LIX.

J. A. FROUDE.

A tribe, if local circumstances are favourable, may maintain its freedom against a more powerful neighbour, so long as the independence of such a tribe is a lesser evil than the cost of its subjugation; but an independence so protracted is rarely other than a misfortune. On the whole, and as a rule, superior strength is the equivalent of superior merit; and when a weaker people are induced or forced to part with their separate existence, and are not treated as subjects, but are admitted freely to share the privileges of the nation in which they are absorbed, they forfeit nothing which they need care to lose, and rather gain than suffer by the exchange. It is possible that a nobler people may, through force of circumstances, or great numerical inferiority, be oppressed for a time by the brute force of baser adversaries, just as within the limits of a nation, particular classes may be tyrannized over, or opinions which prove in the end true may be put down by violence, and the professors of such opinions persecuted. But the effort of nature is constantly to redress the balance. Where freedom is so precious that without

it life is unendurable, men with these convictions fight too fiercely to be permanently subdued. Truth grows by its own virtue, and falsehood sinks and fades. An oppressed cause, when it is just, attracts friends and commands moral support, which converts itself sooner or later into material strength. . . . . There is no freedom possible to man except in obedience to law, and those who cannot prescribe a law to themselves if they desire to be free, must be content to accept direction from others.

LX.

NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE.

The faun is the marble image of a young man, leaning his right arm on the trunk or stump of a tree; one hand hangs carelessly by his side; in the other he holds the fragment of a pipe, or some such sylvan instrument of music. His only garment—a lion's skin with the claws upon his shoulder—falls half-way down his back, leaving the limbs and entire front of the figure nude. The form thus displayed is marvellously graceful, but has a fuller and more rounded outline, more flesh and less of heroic muscle than the old sculptors were wont to assign to their types of masculine beauty. The character of the face corresponds with the figure: it is most agreeable in outline and feature, but rounded and somewhat voluptuously developed, especially about the throat and chin; the nose is almost straight, but very slightly curves inward, thereby acquiring an indescribable charm of geniality and

humour. The mouth, with its full yet delicate lips, seems so nearly to smile outright that it calls forth a responsive smile. The whole statue, unlike anything else that was ever wrought in that severe material of marble, conveys the idea of an amiable and sensual creature, easy, mirthful, apt for jollity, yet not incapable of being touched by pathos. It is impossible to gaze long at this stone image without conceiving a kindly sentiment towards it, as if its substance were warm to the touch, and imbued with actual life.

LXI.

STUBBS.

No sovereign who ever reigned has won from contemporary writers such a singular unison of praises. He was religious, pure in life, temperate, liberal, careful and yet splendid, merciful, truthful, and honourable; "discreet in mind, provident in counsel, prudent in judgment, modest in look, magnanimous in act;" a brilliant soldier, a sound diplomatist, an able organizer and consolidator of all the forces at his command; the restorer of the English navy, the founder of our military, international and maritime law. A true Englishman, with all the greatnesses and none of the glaring faults of his Plantagenet ancestors, he stands forth as the typical mediæval hero. At the same time he is a laborious man of business, a self-denying and hardy warrior, a cultivated scholar, and a most devout and charitable Christian. Fortunately perhaps for himself, unfortunately for his country, he was

cut off before the test of time and experience was applied to try the fixedness of his character and the possible permanence of his plans.

LXII.

THE SAME.

On both these critical occasions he shows good faith and honest intent rather than policy or foresight. As king we find him suspicious, cold-blooded, and politic; undecided in action, cautious and jealous in private and public relations, and, if not personally cruel, willing to sanction and profit by the cruelties of others. Throughout his career he is consistently devout, pure in life, temperate and careful to avoid offence, faithful to the Church and clergy, unwavering in orthodoxy, keeping always before his eye the design with which he began his active life, hoping to die a crusader. Throughout his career, too, he is consistent in political faith; the house of Lancaster had risen by advocating constitutional principles, and on constitutional principles they governed. Henry IV. ruled his kingdom with the aid of a council such as he had tried to force on Richard II., and yielded to his Parliaments all the power, place and privilege that had been claimed for them by the great houses which he represented. It is only after six years of sad experience have proved to him that he can trust none of his old friends, when one by one the men that stood by him at his coronation have fallen victims to their own treasons or to the dire necessity of his policy, that he becomes

vindictive, suspicious, and irresolute, and tries to justify, on the plea of necessity, the cruelties at which, as a younger man, he would have shuddered.

LXIII.

MARK PATTISON.

The finite understanding is crushed when it is brought into the presence of the infinite expanse of the knowable, and turns aside in despair, crying, Who is sufficient for these things? *Ars longa, vita brevis!* Education, which opens this wonderful prospect before us, does but show us from the top of Pisgah the land flowing with milk and honey, which we can never appropriate. Education . . . . . is indeed more than humbling; the immensity of knowledge would crush the understanding; we should be compelled, not to humility, but to despair, if, when we reached this point in our progress, relief were not afforded to us of a kind till then unknown. There is a point in the career of the learner when, as objects multiply around him with dazzling rapidity, and what is to be learned grows in a ratio far beyond his powers of learning it, there breaks a new light in upon him; he becomes conscious of a force within himself; he feels the stirring of an innate power unknown before. His position with regard to things without, to other men, is from this moment altered. His intelligence is not only the passive recipient of forms from without, a mere mirror in which the increasing crowd of images confuse and threaten to obliterate each other; it becomes active and throws itself out upon

phenomena with a native force, combining or analyzing them—anyhow altering them, reducing them, subjecting them, imposing itself upon them. *Vivida vis animi pervicit;* it has broken the bonds which held it captive, the spiritual principle within is born; we begin to live with a life which is above nature. The point of time in our mental progress at which this change takes place cannot be precisely marked; it is a result gradually reached, as every higher form of life is developed by insensible transition out of a lower.

THE END.

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